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ABSTRACT
Federal appellate courts have significant discretion to set the internal
policies that govern the appeals process, and they have used that discretion
to institute policies designed to combat increasing caseloads. This Article
takes a close look at one such policy: early announcement of panel
composition in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. In stark contrast to every
other circuit, the D.C. Circuit announces panel composition to litigants in
civil appeals well in advance of oral argument, and it does so at least in part
to encourage settlement and control the court’s workload. This Article
concludes that although there are indications that the policy is serving its
intended purpose, the effect is far from dramatic. To understand the limited
effect, the Article first considers various barriers created by the content of
the court’s cue and by the ways that litigants respond to that content. The
Article then explores how those barriers might alter the pool of cases that
proceed to a merits decision.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past quarter century, the United States Courts of
Appeals have been experiencing a well-publicized caseload crisis. 2
Filings increased from 47,000 in 1992 to almost 68,500 in 2005 while
the number of authorized judges has remained constant. 3 Unlike the
Supreme Court, which by virtue of its discretionary jurisdiction 4 has a
highly effective internal mechanism for regulating its workload, 5 the
appellate courts are in many respects powerless to combat the rising
tide. Instead, their primary source of relief is legislative action,
through measures like the tightening of jurisdictional requirements 6

2

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
59-93 (1985); Martin J. Dragich, Once a Century: Time for a Structural Overhaul of
the Federal Courts, 1996 WISC. L. REV. 11, 25-26 (1996) (discussing federal
caseload crisis); Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts:
Rationing Federal Justice by Recovering Limited Jurisdiction, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1485,
1487-91 (1995) (same).
3
Appellate Judicial Caseload Profile, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/cgibin/cmsa.pl.
4
Although not unlimited, the Supreme Court has significant ability via the writ
of certiorari to control the cases it hears. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and
Discretion Revisited. 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1891, 1896 -1900 (2004); David L.
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985).
5
The Supreme Court’s discretion to accept cases has resulted in a substantial
decline in the number of published opinions in the last 60 years. See, Richard A.
Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV 31, 66 (2005).
6
Between 1935 and 1981, at least sixty-four bills were introduced that proposed
stripping federal jurisdiction over various categories of cases and recently Congress
has debated four new bills limiting or removing jurisdiction of the federal courts.
Travis Christopher Barham, Congress Gave and Congress Hath Taken Away:
Jurisdiction Withdrawal and the Constitution, 62 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1143-
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and the addition of new judicial positions. 7 No such measure has been
used sufficiently to overcome the increases in case filings, and other
legislative action has effectively counteracted their limited use. 8
The lack of direct methods of caseload control has not stopped
the appellate courts from taking various steps to address the problem.
In recent years, most appellate courts have instituted or enhanced their
mediation and settlement programs in an effort to remove cases from
the docket 9 ; many have increased their use of unpublished opinions to
dispose of cases with greater efficiency 10 ; and some have aggressively
promoted arbitration as an alternative to litigation. 11
1148 (2005). Many of these bills were motivated by political considerations rather
than judicial workload concerns.
7
Congress added 35 judgeships in 1978, 24 judgeships in 1984 and 11
judgeships in 1990. Congress also created the Federal Circuit in 1982 with 12
judges. U.S. Court of Appeals, Additional Judgeships Authorized by Judgeship Acts,
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/history/tablec.pdf.
8
Most significantly, Congress has expanded federal jurisdiction over time by
creating new federal causes of action. See, e.g., Toby J. Stern, Federal Judges and
Fearing the “Floodgates of Litigation,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 388 (2004); J.
Harvie Wilkinson, The Drawbacks of Growth in the Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY
L.J. 1147 1148-49 (1994). Another problem has been the increased politicization
of court appointments, which has led to many authorized judgeships sitting unfilled
for lengthy periods of time. See David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The
President, the Senate, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 479
(2005). See also, Carl Tobias, The Federal Appellate Courts Conundrum, 2005
UTAH L. REV. 743 (2005). And the courts themselves have played a role in
increasing the scope of federal jurisdiction by recognizing new or expanded causes
of action. See Stern, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. at 388-89.
9
All thirteen circuit courts have instituted alternative dispute resolution
programs pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 33, which provides for alternative means of
settling disputes at the appellate level with the assistance of a court appointed neutral
party. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS 2 (1997). The Ninth Circuit instituted its appellate mediation
program in 1984 and in 1994 achieved a 73% disposition rate by settling 598 cases.
Ignacio J. Ruvolo, Appellate Mediation – “Settling” The Last Frontier of ADR, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 177 (2005).
10
The dramatic rise of unpublished opinions comes as of the result of a push in
the 1970s to establish criteria for when opinions should remain unpublished. Michael
Hannon, A Closer Look at Unpublished Opinions in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 199, 201 (2001). Since then unpublished
opinions have increased from 11.5% of total opinions in 1981 to 81.6% in 2005 with
the number increasing each year and consistently reaching over 90% in the Fourth
Circuit. See id. at 203 and U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS: 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR tbl. S-3 (2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html). See also, Posner,
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This article focuses on a different kind of approach used by
appellate courts to alleviate the caseload crunch. The body of
procedures that govern an appeal in the federal courts is comprised of
several sources, of which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Criminal Procedure and Appellate Procedure are only the most
obvious and visible. Each of those sets of rules is mandatory and
fixed, and courts have little power to change them. 12 By contrast, a
court’s internal rules and procedures are far more malleable. Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 permits appellate courts to introduce
local rules and procedures, so long as they are consistent with the
mandatory procedural rules and an opportunity for notice and
comment is provided. 13 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b) further requires each
court of appeals to establish an advisory committee “for the study of
the rules of practice and internal operating procedures of such
court.” 14 Notice and comment periods and advisory committees aside,
supra note 2, at 162-71. However, the effectiveness of unpublished opinions as a
time-saving measure may well be undercut by the recently adopted Fed. R. App. P.
32.1, which allows citation to unpublished opinions as precedential authority. Pierre
N. Leval, Citation of Unpublished Opinions, Panel Discussion, The Appellate
Judges Speak, 74 FORDHAM L. REV 1, 14 (2005) (arguing that permitting citation to
unpublished opinions will require judges to spend more time on those opinions).
11
Courts are upholding arbitration awards with narrow review to ensure that
arbitration is an alternative step, not another layer in litigation. B.L. Harbert
International v. Hercules Steel Co., 441 F.3d 905 (11th Cir. 2006). See also, Cyctyc
Corp. v. DEKA Products Ltd. Partnership, 439 F.3d 27, 33 (1st Cir. 2006)
(emphasizing that court review of arbitral awards is narrower than review of lower
court decisions by appellate courts).
12
I say little power rather than no power to account for obvious caveats. First,
courts and judges can (and do) promote modifications to the rules, either by writing
opinions that point out perceived weaknesses in the rules as constituted or by
engaging in more informal advocacy such as giving speeches, writing articles, or
placing phone calls. This may be viewed as power to change the rules, but it is
power of an indirect and uncertain variety. Second, courts can control the formal
procedural rules to the extent that their terms are open to interpretation. But
interpretations that deviate too far afield are likely to be noticed and policed by the
Supreme Court. A prominent recent example of judicial efforts along these lines
was the attempts by lower courts – followed by rejections by the Supreme Court – to
impose heightened pleading requirement in certain contexts. See Leatherman v.
Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 1163 (1993);
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002).
13
Fed. R. App. P. 47; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (providing statutory authority
for courts of appeals to introduce rules and procedures).
14
28 U.S.C. § 2077(a) adds the further requirement that a court’s rules and
procedures be published.
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Rule 47 clearly places the ultimate authority for rulemaking in the
hands of the judges themselves. 15
Local rulemaking authority is not limitless by any stretch, but
it does provide a space in which courts can act directly and with
relative ease. And there is some evidence that courts are maneuvering
within that space to address caseload concerns. This article takes a
close look at one example of such an effort. In 1986, the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals used its rulemaking authority to
alter the internal procedure for announcing the composition of merits
panels to litigants. 16 Prior to that year, all federal circuits announced
the composition of appellate panels only shortly before a scheduled
oral argument. Under the D.C. Circuit’s modified procedure, panel
announcement instead comes within sixty days of filing and
accompanies the initial scheduling of oral argument. 17 As a result,
litigants receive panel composition information up to six months in
advance of oral argument.
No official explanation accompanied the introduction of the
new procedure, but at least one judge then serving on the court has
provided an informal account. According to Judge Harry T. Edwards,
the primary motivation was the convenience of the parties. 18 But a
secondary motivation also existed:

15

Fed. R. App. P. 47(a)(1) (requiring only a majority vote by active regular
service judges to promulgate local rules and procedures).
16
The versions of Fed. R. App. P. 47 and 28 U.S.C. § 2077 applicable in 1986
were different from the current versions, but not appreciably so. An advisory
committee was still required for the courts of appeals (although not for district
courts), and
17
“Ordinarily, the Court discloses merits panels to counsel in the order setting
the case for oral argument.” United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, Handbook of Practice and Internal Procedures, § II.B.8(a), in 5
FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES (West 2d ed. 1997; rev. April 1999). “[I]n civil
cases, oral argument dates and panels are usually set before the briefs are filed.” Id.
at § IV.A.3. See also Patricia M. Wald, . . . Doctor, Lawyer, Merchant, Chief, 60
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1127, 1138 (1992) (“We took a chance on disclosing the
identities of merits panels, as well as the dates of oral argument, within sixty days of
filing.”). As Judge Wald’s comment makes clear, the D.C. Circuit policy is
applicable only in civil cases.
18
Harry T. Edwards, Letter to Robert Brown and Allison Lee, quoted in J.
Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Appendix: The Neutral Assignment of
Judges
at
the
Court
of
Appeals,
at
http://www.law.du.edu/courts/Jones_article_webmaterial_2000.htm
(accessed
January 24, 2006).

Early Panel Announcement

6

It occurred to us that this false assumption [that panel
composition permitted prediction of the outcome]
might lead some parties to settle their claims to avoid
certain panels. We were happy to accommodate those
who might thus settle their cases and thereby reduce
our caseload. 19
For almost twenty years, no other circuits followed the D.C.
Circuit’s move toward earlier announcement. Then, in 2004, the
Federal Circuit provisionally adopted a rule change that moved the
announcement of panels to an earlier stage in the proceedings. Rather
than announce panel assignment on the morning of the argument, the
new rule provided for that announcement one week in advance of the
argument. 20 Shortly before the actual adoption of this procedural
change, Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge discussed it in
hypothetical terms and concluded – echoing Judge Edwards – that
earlier announcement “would be a simple, cost-free way for the court
to increase the settlement rate.”21 There were early signs that the new
procedure was indeed affecting litigant behavior. Most notably, the
parties informed the court during oral argument in Apotex v. Pfizer22
that Pfizer had executed a covenant not to sue for patent infringement.
19

Id. See also Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function and the Elusive Goal of
Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 837, 853-54 (“[I]n the D.C. Circuit,
the names of the judges who are assigned to hear an appeal are announced well in
advance to encourage … settlements. By blaming their withdrawal on the
composition of judicial panels, rather than on the merits of their cases, lawyers are
able to save face while simultaneously freeing the court system of unnecessary
burdens. If this provides a palatable excuse and thus increases settlements, then the
false image of a politicized judiciary may have some salutary effect.”).
20
Although this change is noteworthy for present purposes because it shifted
panel announcement to an earlier point in the appeals process, even it does not come
close to replicating the D.C. Circuit’s extreme policy. Instead, the provisional rule
brought the Federal Circuit’s policy in line with the policies of many circuits that
announce panels shortly before the scheduled argument. See Howard J. Bashman,
Who’s on the Argument Panel:
Why Ignorance Isn’t Bliss, available at
www.law.com (April 3, 2006) (describing announcement policies).
21
R. Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1175
(2004). Unlike Judge Edwards, however, Wagner and Petherbridge ultimately
cautioned against adoption of an early announcement procedure – despite its promise
as a caseload-reducing tool. For further discussion of their reasons for sounding
cautionary notes, see infra Part III.A.
22
125 Fed.Appx. 987 (Fed. Cir. April 11, 2005).
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The covenant not to sue rendered the appeal moot, and the court
promptly issued a short opinion dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction. There is good reason to believe that Pfizer’s action was
in direct response to panel announcement. 23 But rather than being
viewed as an indication of success, at least one member of the panel
lamented the result, remarking during argument that “maybe posting
paneling is a very, very bad thing.” 24 And it would appear that Judge
Mayer was not alone in that sentiment; as of February 6, 2006, the
court has reverted to its original procedure of announcing panels on
the day of a scheduled argument. 25
The recent Federal Circuit experimentation with – and
rejection of – early announcement, along with the ever-increasing
pressures for courts to find ways to handle cases efficiently, occasions
a new examination of the effectiveness and effect of early
announcement rules in particular and of local rules designed to address
caseload concerns in general. Part I.A begins by situating the D.C.
Circuit procedure as a form of “cue and response.” The belief that
early panel announcement will generate increased settlement activity
is based on assumptions that litigants will perceive the announcement
as a relevant cue and that they will respond to the cue by pursuing
settlement. The rise of theoretical and empirical accounts of the
“attitudinal model” of judging provides support for the cuing
assumption because it has led to a growing perception that the identity
of the judge matters to the outcome of the case. In the context of
appeals, that translates to a perception that the composition of judicial
panels matters, due either to a simple aggregation of the individual
effects of judicial characteristics or to the combined effect of group
characteristics. Support for the response assumption comes from the
conventional law and economics theory of settlement, which posits
that settlement decisions are responsive to information regarding likely
23

In Apotex, the issue related to whether the filing of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) by itself creates a reasonable apprehension of suit. In an
earlier case, Pfizer v. Teva, the Federal Circuit had held that it does not. Judge
Mayer, who dissented in Teva, was assigned to the Apotex panel, a sign that perhaps
the Pfizer holding was insecure. The covenant not to sue was entered into after the
panel was announced. Patently-O, patentlaw.typepad.com (March 14 and April 11,
2005).
24
Patently-O, patentlaw.typepad.com (March 14, 2005).
25
According to Howard Bashman, the reversion to the original announcement
procedure was also motivated by a “negative reaction to an increased amount of
attorney pandering at oral argument.” See Bashman, supra note 20.
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outcome and that settlement is more likely when the probable outcome
is more certain. If the court’s cue equates to new information that
makes the probably outcome more certain, litigants should respond,
and their response should lead to settlement in at least some cases.
Despite the fairly straightforward case for a settlement effect,
Part I.B concludes that the D.C. Circuit rule has been only weakly
effective in those terms. I begin by comparing rates of voluntary
dismissal in civil non-administrative cases filed in the Second, Seventh
and D.C. Circuits, and find no significant difference between the
circuits. If anything, the rate of voluntary dismissal appears lower in
the D.C. Circuit than in the other circuits studied, even when
controlling for subject matter and governmental involvement. Of
course, an inter-circuit study may mislead if other differences in
practice or procedure contribute to general variances in the rate of
voluntary dismissal across circuits. To account for that possibility, I
look instead at voluntary dismissal activity within the D.C. Circuit
alone. Of 63 cases in which a panel was assigned, 13 were dismissed
voluntarily prior to oral argument. Although there is no way to assess
from docket sheet information whether these dismissals were directly
responsive to panel announcement, that number provides at least weak
support that the announcement rule affects behavior in some cases.
Part II discusses various barriers that limit the effectiveness of
early announcement as a settlement-promoting tool. Some of these
barriers stem from failures in the content of the court’s cue, while
others owe to failures in the way litigants respond to the cue. Content
barriers arise when the actual panel composition information does not
produce significant updating relative to a litigant’s pre-announcement
outcome prediction. This is true, for example, when the announced
panel is ideologically close to the panel that would be expected given
the court’s overall composition. It is also true when litigants do not
perceive the outcome to be affected by the particulars of panel
composition – in other words, when litigants do not view the
attitudinal model as operational in practice. Response barriers arise
when litigants do not perceive and respond to the court’s cue
rationally. Some litigants may simply fail to notice the cue. More
likely, many litigants may notice the cue but then make mistakes
interpreting and incorporating its content. To the extent they occur, all
of these barriers are largely intractable. This is because the actions
necessary to overcome them would require the court to take an
unacceptably active role in the dissemination and interpretation of the
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announcement cue. In the end, the stubbornness of these various
barriers means that the early announcement procedure can only hope
to have a limited effect.
Part III explores how the barriers that limit the early
announcement procedure’s effectiveness may also introduce
distortions into the body of cases that ultimately proceed to oral
argument. As an example, consider the barrier created by the fact that
some panels are not particularly predictable. This barrier is also the
source of a distortion because it means that relatively more cases
involving predictable panels will settle, and conversely that the panels
hearing the cases that proceed to oral argument will be relatively more
unpredictable. Other distortions include overrepresentation among
oral argument cases of appeals that involve unsophisticated litigants,
are motivated by an interest in a judgment per se, and that are
relatively non-responsive to panel composition. Each of these
distortions has the potential to create serious problems in terms of the
court’s ability to perform its adjudicative functions adequately. Those
serious problems arise only in the extreme case, however, and the
extreme case is unlikely because the existence of other barriers
contains the severity of any one distortion. Even so, caseload
distortions as a by-product of the early announcement procedure
deserve careful attention. Similar distortions are possible whenever a
court introduces a “cue and response” procedure, and full
consideration of the desirability of any such procedure should account
for them.
I. THE D.C. CIRCUIT PROCEDURE: THEORY AND EFFECT
Why would Judge Edwards believe that early announcement
will increase settlement activity? The basic theory is one of cue and
response: Early announcement constitutes a cue to litigants, who
respond because they believe that the content of the cue is relevant. In
basic terms, early announcement is deemed a relevant cue because
litigants are assumed to perceive a relationship between the identity of
judges assigned to hear the appeal and the likely outcome of the
appeal. And litigants are expected to pursue settlement in response
because settlement decisions are related to expectations about likely
outcome. If the cue and response theory holds up in practice, we
should expect that the degree of pre-argument settlement activity will
be higher when the cue is provided than when it is not. In other
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words, we might expect the rate of voluntary dismissal in the D.C.
Circuit to be higher than in other circuits. I find no evidence to
support this expectation. But that result might be misleading; other
unmeasured forces may contribute to inter-circuit differences in
settlement activity that mask the effect of the early announcement
procedure. In an attempt to better isolate the procedure’s effect, I
conclude this section with a closer analysis of D.C. Circuit cases. That
analysis suggests that the procedure may be achieving its intended
effect in some cases.
A. Theory: Panel Announcement, Informational Cues and Settlement
There is a strong predisposition in the American legal system
toward the formalist notion that judges perform their function without
recourse to personal ideology or past experience. That view is a
predictable corollary of our democratic ideals of blind justice and
equality under the law. 26 So understood, the judge is “one who
objectively and impersonally decides cases by logically deducing the
correct resolution from a definite and consistent body of legal rules.” 27
Judges themselves have been among the most vigorous defenders of
the formalist model. 28 In a very recent example, then-Judge Roberts
26

See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A
Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 251, 255-64
(1997); Doreen McBarnet & Christopher Whelan, The Elusive Spirit of the Law:
Formalism and the Struggle for Legal Control, 54 MOD. L. REV. 848, 871 (1991)
(“[T]here is a fundamental formalism inherent in the very idea of legal control in the
liberal democratic state which makes formalist argument difficult to resist or easy to
justify.”); EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-75
(1973).
27
John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to
Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45
DUKE L.J. 84, 87 (1995). For a classic enunciation of the formalist approach, see
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that “legal analysis . . . can and should be free from
contaminating political or ideological elements”).
28
The judicial defense of formalism has a distinguished pedigree. See, e.g.,
Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 866 (1824) (“Courts are the mere
instruments of the law, and can will nothing. . . . Judicial power is never exercised
for the purpose of giving effect to the will of the Judge.”) (Marshall, C.J.). For a
more recent Supreme Court articulation of formalist ideals, see Liteky v. United
States, 510 U.S. 540, 561-62 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Judges, if faithful to
their oath, approach every aspect of each case with a neutral and objective
disposition.”).
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testified in his Supreme Court confirmation hearings that “judges wear
black robes because it doesn’t matter who they are as individuals.
That’s not going to shape their decisionmaking.
It’s their
29
understanding of the law that will shape their decision.” And Judge
Edwards has argued that “it is the law – and not the personal politics
of individual judges – that controls judicial decision-making in most
cases resolved by the courts of appeals.” 30
Over the past century or more, this formalist vision of judges
has come under sustained attack by legal scholars and social
scientists. 31 Legal realists and critical legal theorists have long argued
that, far from being impersonal, judging is an endeavor acutely
affected by the personal ideology and experience of those holding the
office. 32 In response to the formalist model, legal realists developed
the “indeterminacy argument,” which asserts that judicial decisions
cannot be rationally deduced because of conflicting rules within the
law and because of the susceptibility of those rules to conflicting
interpretations. 33 Rather than rational deduction, the legal realists
29

Hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, J-10937 at 178 (2005) (testimony of Hon. John G. Roberts). Similarly, Patricia Wald has
urged that “[t]he black robes we wear on the bench unite us in their lack of
distinguishability; they make a simple but striking point: We are neither Democratic
judges nor Republican judges but, simply, United States judges.” Patricia M. Wald,
Colloquy: A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235, 240 (1999).
30
Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the ‘Politics’ of
Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619,
620 (1985). See also Bartlett v. Bowen, 824 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Edwards, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (defending the “integrity
of panel judges, who are both intelligent enough to know the law and conscientious
enough to abide by their oath to uphold it”).
31
For early formulations of the argument that judicial attitudes affect
decisionmaking, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 116 (1930); Karl
N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence – The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
443 (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the
“Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 277-78 (1929).
32
See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter, Theodore Eisenberg, & Steward J. Schwab,
Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of Judicial Background on Case Outcomes,
24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 257 (1995)(“Since the rise of legal realism, it has been
axiomatic that the background and worldview of judges influence cases.”).
33
For a good discussion of the development of the indeterminacy argument, see
Hasnas, supra note 27, at 86-98. Critical Legal Theorists revived the realist
indeterminacy argument in the 1980s. For an example of such a revival, see Gary
Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1152, 1152-53
(1985)(arguing that application of legal rules is necessarily informed by both policy
considerations and political considerations).
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contend that legal decisions are the result of judicial choices regarding
which rules to apply and how to apply them. Those choices are in turn
determined by value judgments and judicial beliefs about the propriety
of certain outcomes. 34
Social science studies developing an “attitudinal model” of
judicial behavior lend general credence to the realist view. 35 These
studies attempt to establish links between various judicial
characteristics and voting outcomes. The link most often studied is
that between voting behavior and ideology. Studies of this sort
typically measure ideology by reference to the party affiliation of the
nominating President, 36 although studies using other ideological
indicators also exist. 37 In addition to ideology, studies have analyzed
correlations between voting behavior and various other judicial
34

See, e.g., Posner, supra note 5 (articulating a similar realist explanation of the
Court).
35
See generally, JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993). The “attitudinal model” moniker is not
universally accepted, but it is prevalent and will be used throughout this article for
the sake of simplicity and clarity. See also CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL? (2006).
36
See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770-71 (1997) (discussing the District of
Columbia Circuit in particular); Donald R. Songer, The Circuit Courts of Appeals, in
THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 35, 42-43 (John B. Gates &
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Donald R. Songer & Sue Davis, The Impact of Party
and Region on Voting Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1955-1986,
43 W. POL. Q. 317, 322-23 (1990); Richard J. Pierce, Two Problems in
Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and
Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 303-07 (discussing
the District of Columbia Circuit in particular); Jon Gottschall, Reagan’s
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial
Revolution, 70 JUDICATURE 48, 51-54 (1986); ROBERT A. CARP & C.K. ROWLAND,
POLICYMAKING AND POLITICS IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 51-83 (1983); C.
Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 355, 362-63 (1981); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 374, 376-83 (1966); Stuart S.
Nagel, Political Party Affiliation and Judges’ Decisions, 55 AMER. POL. SCI. REV.
843, 845 (1961).
37
See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal, et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 818 (1995)(using newspapers
editorials to establish ideological values). Indeed, even Judge Wald has conceded
that “subtly or unconsciously, the judge’s political orientation will affect
decisionmaking.” Patricia M. Wald, quoted in LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN
COURTS 13 (3d ed. 1994).
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characteristics, including geography, 38 age, 39 gender, 40 religion, 41
tenure, 42 and past experience. 43 Most – although certainly not all – of
these studies claim to find positive correlations between judicial
characteristics and voting patterns. And although the methodology
employed has been the source of some debate, 44 their cumulative
effect – together with the theoretical work of the legal realists and their
successors – has been to solidify the notion that judicial characteristics
matter to legal outcomes. In short, even if not accurate, the attitudinal
model of judging has become prevalent, and prevalence is good
enough to support the claim that litigants might view the identity of
the judge as a relevant factor in the prediction of a case’s outcome. 45
38

See, e.g., Songer & Davis, supra note 36.
See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, The Effect of Past Judicial Behavior on
Subsequent Decision-Making, 19 JURIMETRICS J. 208, 212 (1979)(finding age a
relatively important factor for Civil Liberties voting).
40
See, e.g., Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and
Collegial Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L. J. 1759
(2005); G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596 (1985)(female judges tend to be
less supportive of personal rights claims and minority policy positions than male
judges, and tend to demonstrate greater deference to positions taken by the
government); but see Herbert M. Kritzer & Thomas M. Uhlman, Sisterhood in the
Courtroom: Sex of Judge and Defendant in Criminal Case Disposition, 14 SOC. SCI.
J. 77, 86 (1977)(female judges behave no differently than their male colleagues in
sentencing criminal defendants).
41
See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 39; Joel B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds
and Judicial Decisionmaking, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551 (1966).
42
See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of Intent:
Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1190 (1991);
Goldman, supra note 39.
43
See Eisenberg & Johnson, supra note 42 (finding a correlation between voting
in racial equal protection cases and prior prosecutorial experience); Goldman, supra
note 39.
44
Compare Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1 (2002) with Frank Cross, Michael Heise & Gregory Sisk, Above the Rules: A
Response to Epstein and King, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 135 (2002) and Jack Goldsmith &
Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 153 (2002). See also H.W. Perry, Taking Political Science Seriously, 47 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 889, 891 (2003) (claiming that most political scientists would not
believe that attitudes are the sole determinant, or that they play as singular a role as
propounded by the so-called "attitudinal model").
45
Of particular relevance here is the explicit connection some have made
between the attitudinal model and effective lawyering:
Because judicial
characteristics affect outcomes, those characteristics (and other external factors that
might influence decisions) should be accounted for and integrated into the lawyer’s
39
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If lawyers believe that judicial characteristics affect the
decisions of individual judges, then it is no great stretch to conclude
that they might also believe that the combined characteristics of a
panel of judges will affect collective judicial decisions. That
conclusion follows a simple application of the attitudinal model to
three-judge panels, and it has led some to criticize the current practice
of randomly assigning judges to appellate panels. 46 More generally, it
decisionmaking process. So, for example, Hasnas has urged that lawyers “would be
better able to predict the outcome of cases and correctly advise their clients if they
studied the social factors that influence[] judges’ behavior.” Hasnas, supra note 27,
at 89; see also Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and
Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 581 (1993)(“Not surprisingly, according to the
realist, the ideal lawyer is the one who is in the best position to counsel his clients
about what to expect from litigation. That lawyer will need to know what leads
judges to decide as they do, not what legal reasons, if any, would justify their
decisions.... The best explanation of judicial decisions may include the set of binding
legal reasons, but cannot be limited to them. Instead, explanations will point to
psychological and sociological facts about judges as part, if not all, of the causal
story.”).
46
Although not required by statute, every circuit of the United States Court of
Appeals now uses some form of random assignment to compose the three-judge
panels who hear and decide cases. See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences,
Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627, 630
(1994)(describing random assignment as a central characteristic of federal judicial
procedure). For a description of the specific assignment procedures used by the
various circuits, see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Appendix: The
Neutral
Assignment
of
Judges
at
the
Court
of
Appeals,
at
http://www.law.du.edu/courts/Jones_article_webmaterial_2000.htm (accessed May
15, 2006).
Random assignment arguably contains an implicit endorsement of judicial
formalism because it assumes that “all judges act with reasonably equivalent
motives,” such that random assignment is neutral with respect to case outcomes.
Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, Colloquy: A Modest Proposal for Improving
American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 217 (1999). But if the attitudinal model
is correct, then random assignment will not necessarily guarantee neutrality and a
non-random assignment procedure might be required to achieve neutral panels. For
further discussion of proposals for introducing neutral but non-random assignment
procedures, see infra note 117.
Two additional points related to random assignment and neutrality merit brief
mention. First, the practice of random assignment might be defended on grounds
other than neutrality. That is, it may be that courts fully realize that panel
composition will affect case outcomes, but that they nevertheless feel that random
assignment is the best way to deal with that fact. However, given the strong defense
of judicial formalism by most judges, it is reasonable to conclude that random
assignment would be defended instead on neutrality grounds. For an enunciation of
the contrary interpretation, see J. Robert Brown, Jr. & Allison Herren Lee, Neutral
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has generated concern about the influence of panel composition on
case outcomes. As expressed by Michael Hasday, “[w]inning a case
in the U.S. courts of appeals hinges too much on luck, and not enough
on the merits. The system produces slot machine justice, in which the
outcome crucially turns on the three judges selected to hear the
case.” 47 Given the numerous attitudinal studies, and the clear logical
connection between those studies and the conclusion that the
composition of panels is an important determinant of case outcomes,
the prevalence of this concern is hardly surprising.
Recently a second argument has been developed that provides
additional support for the notion that panel composition affects case
outcomes. Building on insights from the psychology of group
decision-making, Richard Revesz, Cass Sunstein and others have
argued that the interplay of characteristics among the three judges on a
panel affect voting patterns in ways that are different than a simple
aggregation of individual characteristics might suggest. 48
For
example, both Sunstein and Revesz have concluded that, at least in
certain contexts, the ideology of other judges on a panel is as good or
better a predictor of a judge’s vote than his or her own ideology. 49
Assignment of Judges at the Court of Appeals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1066-69
(2000)(arguing that “the system can do no more than ensure that, whatever biases
judges bring to the decisionmaking process, they play no role in the assignment
process”). Second, formalistic ideals are by no means the only rationale for random
assignment. To the contrary, random assignment also serves to “prevent[] judge
shopping by any party, thereby enhancing public confidence in the assignment
process,” and to “ensure[] an equitable distribution of the case load” among judges
of a court. United States v. Mavroules, 798 F.Supp. 61, 61 (D.Mass. 1992).
47
Michael Hasday, Ending the Reign of Slot Machine Justice, 57 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 291 (2000). Similarly, Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross have argued
that partisan imbalances in panel composition “often lead to case outcomes that
reflect partisan interests.” Emerson H. Tiller and Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposal
for Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215.
48
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological
Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV.
301, 337-46 (2004); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107
YALE L.J. 2155, 2168-72 (1998); Revesz, supra note 36.
49
Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 317; Revesz, supra note 36, at 319 (looking
specifically at environmental regulation cases in the District of Columbia Circuit,
and noting that “the party affiliation of the other judges on the panel has a greater
bearing on a judge’s vote than his or her own affiliation”). See also, Thomas J.
Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy, (forthcoming 2006)
(draft
available
at
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/Sunstein%20Realism%20Chevron.pdf).
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And both have concluded that ideologically uniform panels behave
differently than those that are ideologically diverse.50 There is more
to be said about these studies, 51 but for present purposes it is enough
to note that arguments concerning “panel dynamics” reinforce the
basic notion that predictions as to outcome can be meaningfully
updated and improved if the identity of judges assigned to reach the
outcome is known in advance.
It remains to establish a connection between predictive updates
regarding likely outcome and a litigant’s subsequent decision to
continue the appeal or to pursue voluntarily dismissal, either through
settlement or – in the case of an appellant – through a unilateral
motion to dismiss. This connection is a natural extension of the wellaccepted proposition that decisions regarding litigation and settlement
are affected to a great extent by expectations about outcome. More
than twenty years ago, George Priest and Benjamin Klein argued that
the “the determinants of settlement and litigation are solely economic,
including the expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse
decisions, the information that parties possess about the likelihood of
success at trial, and the direct costs of litigation and settlement.” 52
Relevant considerations that inform the likelihood of success at trial
should include the “predilections of a judge” as well as the
“application of a legal rule.” 53
Those basic conclusions also apply at the appellate level. In
most cases, the economic calculus of the parties should primarily
50

Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 343; Tiller & Cross, supra note 47, at 220221. See also Cross & Tiller, Judicial Partisanship, supra note 48, at 2169-74.
51
See infra notes 108-121 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
panel dynamics.
52
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984). Further studies have softened – or at least clarified –
the strong Priest-Klein assertion in certain limited cases where at least one of the
parties is motivated by an interested in a judgment per se. See generally Steven
Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 434 (2004). In such cases,
settlement may not result even if both parties understand that the plaintiff is very
likely to win. This possibility highlights the fact that “the information that parties
possess about the likelihood of success at trial” is not the only relevant factor to
litigants, and that the “expected costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions”
may dominate in some instances. And they explain why I have hedged a bit by
saying that “decisions regarding litigation and settlement are affected to a great
extent by expectations about outcome.” For a discussion of how an interest in a
judgment per se might limit the effectiveness of early panel announcement, see notes
82 and accompanying text.
53
Priest & Klein, supra note 52, at 35.
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determine whether an appeal is filed in the first instance.54 But if
relevant information regarding the likelihood of success (or any other
economic factor related to the likely costs or benefits of the appeal) is
introduced only after the inception of the appeal, then the economic
calculus will shift and future decisions related to the ongoing appeal
may be affected. For example, suppose that a decision is made to file
an appeal in a particular case, and that the Supreme Court
subsequently issues an opinion that clarifies one of the issues at stake.
In that circumstance, the parties should be expected to update their
predictions regarding the application of legal rules, and new decisions
to settle or dismiss may result. Because it is perceived to bear a
relation to the likely outcome of the appeal, the introduction of panel
composition information at some point in the appeals process operates
in similar fashion. Once that information is announced, predictions
regarding outcome should be updated, and decisions regarding the
desirability of settlement may be altered. 55
In sum, the theory of a settlement effect created by early panel
announcement relies is one of cue and response. Announcing panel
composition at a relatively early stage provides an informational cue
that litigants will view as relevant to the likely outcome of the appeal.
Rational litigants will respond to that cue by updating their
expectations, which may lead to settlement or voluntary dismissal if
the updated expectations create a zone for mutual agreement and if the
cost of pursuing that agreement is less than the additional costs
necessary to pursue the appeal to completion.

54

In fact, according to much of the theoretical literature on the Priest-Klein
hypothesis, decisions to settle after an appeal has been filed are anomalous and occur
only in instances of informational asymmetry. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A
New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 14 (1996).
55
For more on the formal economic models underlying settlement decisions in
response to new information introduced during the appeals process, see generally
Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal Appellate Courts:
Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided Courts, 24 J. LEGAL
STUD. 685 (2000); more generally, see Joseph Grundfest and Peter Huang, The
Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STANFORD L. REV.
___ (forthcoming 2006).
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B. Effect:
Intercircuit Comparison and Intracircuit Analysis
Is the D.C. Circuit’s early announcement rule producing its
intended effect? I approach this question from two directions. First, I
look at the rate of voluntary dismissal in the D.C. Circuit relative to
other circuits. I find that the D.C. Circuit does not have a higher rate
of voluntary dismissal, and that this is true even when accounting for
differences in subject matter and government involvement in the
appeal. This finding is suggestive, but certainly not determinative. If
other unmeasured factors contribute to general differences in the rates
of voluntary dismissal across circuits, then the apparent lack of an
announcement effect could be misleading. 56 To account for that
possibility, I take a close look at the effect of the panel announcement
procedure in the D.C. Circuit and conclude that the procedure appears
to be at least weakly effective in terms of promoting settlement
activity.
1. Intercircuit Comparison of Voluntary Dismissal Activity
The data set for this comparison consists of 600 appeals filed
in the Second, Seventh, and District of Columbia Circuits beginning
on March 1, 2000. Those circuits were selected because they
exemplify the panel announcement variations that are typical across
circuits. Regardless of the internal procedures used for panel
composition and case assignment, most circuits do not announce panel
composition to litigants until shortly before the oral argument is
scheduled. The policy of the Second Circuit is representative in this
regard, with panel assignments announced on the Thursday before the
argument. 57 The Seventh Circuit is the most extreme, releasing the
panel information only on the morning of the argument. 58 In both
circuits, the identity of the panel is not known until after all briefs are
filed.
56

Another way to get a suggestive finding would be to compare voluntary
dismissal rates within the D.C. Circuit before and after adoption of the rule. This
approach has the benefit of eliminating the potential for inter-circuit differences in
the underlying rates of voluntary dismissal, but it runs the risk of simply substituting
inter-temporal differences.
57
Revesz, supra note 55, at 688.
58
Id.
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The start date was selected basically at random, although an
effort was made to choose a date sufficiently early that all appeals
considered in the study had reached a final disposition. For each
circuit, the data consist of the first 200 qualifying appeals filed on or
after the start date. 59 A qualifying appeal is defined for these purposes
as a civil, 60 non-administrative case that is appealed from a federal
district court 61 and that does not involve a prisoner. 62 In addition,
appeals that were consolidated with other appeals already in the data
set were not separately considered. 63
59

This meant that the last appeal considered in the study was filed on: April 14,
2000 in the Second Circuit, April 26, 2000 in the Seventh Circuit, and June 29, 2001
in the District of Columbia Circuit.
60
Criminal appeals are not included primarily because the D.C. Circuit’s early
announcement procedure does not apply to those appeals. See Handbook of
Practice, supra note 17, at § II.B.8(a) (“[I]n criminal appeals, unlike most civil
appeals, the panel will not be disclosed until after the parties have filed briefs.”).
But the exclusion of criminal cases is sensible for other reasons as well. The
traditional settlement calculus, discussed infra Part I.A, does not cleanly apply to
criminal appeals because those cases are not characterized by symmetrical stakes,
cost savings from settlement, and error characteristics. See Kate Stith, The Risk of
Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right
to Appeal, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 15 n. 49 (1990). Exclusion of criminal appeals
should not inhibit the ability of the study to test for an early announcement effect; if
anything, study of civil appeals alone should overestimate the overall effect of an
early announcement procedure on caseload reduction.
61
That is, appeals from bankruptcy and tax courts, as well as those from
administrative agency adjudications, are not considered. Unsurprisingly, this led to
the highest percentage of excluded cases in the D.C. Circuit. These cases were
excluded in an effort to maintain some degree of consistency in the cases, such that
reliable comparisons across circuits could be made. Since most of the literature
concerning the Priest-Klein hypothesis centers around its effect on civil actions, the
analysis in this article is confined to civil appeals.
62
Prisoners generally proceed informa pauperis and their appeals – most often
in the form of habeas corpus or mandamus claims – are not susceptible to settlement
in the same way as private civil appeals. In addition, the economic calculus that
underlies the Priest-Klein hypothesis does not apply to prisoner appeals. Because
the stakes of the appeal are very high and the costs are very low, prisoners are not
likely to be responsive to changes in information regarding probable outcomes. For
further discussion, see generally Theodore Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial
Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 GEO. L.J. 1567 (1989). As with
the exclusion of criminal appeals, see supra note 60, the exclusion of prisoner
appeals should lead, if anything, to an overestimation of the overall settlement effect
of an early announcement procedure.
63
Cross-appeals that led to a different disposition from the original appeal were
included, however.

Early Panel Announcement

20

Information from the court docket sheets was used to code the
data. Although the docket sheet does not contain any categorization
relating to disposition, it does include the relevant information
necessary to create such a categorization. Therefore, I coded the
disposition of each appeal using the following categorization: Oral
Argument (OA), Merits Decision Without Oral Argument (DWOA),
Dismissal by Court (D/C), and Dismissal by Parties (D/P). Table 1
shows the basic results. 65
64

64

Docket sheets are available through the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts’ PACER (Public Access to Court Electronic Records) system, accessible
online at www.pacer.psc.uscourts.gov. Of course, political scientists prefer the use
of standardized data sets rather than individually coded data, and have criticized
legal empirical research on that basis. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., The Political
(Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 783, 807-09 (2003). Although
generally sympathetic to this concern, I am aware of no standardized data source that
includes data of the sort used here.
65
One noteworthy finding from Table 1 – the disproportionately high
percentage of OA cases in the Second Circuit – merits a brief explanation. With few
exceptions, the Second Circuit hears oral argument in every case that proceeds to the
merits stage, and so the DWOA category is essentially a null category in that
circuit.This is an obvious example of how local court practice and procedure can
affect the way that appeals progress. In this case, the Second Circuit’s strong
preference for oral argument means that many appeals proceed to oral argument that
would be decided in other circuits without one. The Second Circuit might justify its
preference in two ways. First, the court may view universal oral argument as a
decision-enhancing mechanism. Even in cases that appear straightforward on the
briefs, oral argument may alter the way the panel views the case. In some small
body of cases, it may even result in a change in the direction or the terms of the
court’s ultimate decision. Alternatively, the court may view universal oral argument
as a perception-enhancing mechanism. That is, even if the court feels that the oral
argument provides no actual benefit in terms of the decisions it reaches, it may prefer
them even so because it is a low-cost way to attain a valuable benefit in the form of
an improved perception of fairness by litigants. This would be true if litigants view
oral argument as an important symbol that the court is taking its case seriously and
considering it carefully. In either case, the rule is in place precisely because the
court expects that it will have some effect on outcome or perception of outcome.
There is a final possibility that is independent of any such anticipated effect. The
court may think that the time and resources necessary to identify cases that would be
candidates for decisions without oral argument exceeds the savings in time and
resources that are gained by deciding them in that manner. Given the relative ease of
issuing an order to dispose of a case without oral argument, however, this
explanation seems quite unlikely.
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Table 1: Disposition of
Appeals, by Circuit

Second
Circuit

Seventh
Circuit

D.C.
Circuit

Oral Argument

100
(50.0%)

66
(33.0%)

50
(25.0%)

Merits Decision without
Oral Argument

4
(2.0%)

31
(15.5%)

69
(34.5%)

Dismissal by Court

36
(18.0%)

41
(20.5%)

40
(20.0%)

Dismissal by Parties

60
(30.0%)

62
(31.0%)

41
(20.5%)

Total

200
(100.0%)

200
200
(100.0%) (100.0%)

A logical analytical starting point is a consideration of the
overall rates of voluntary dismissal for each circuit. The D.C. Circuit
had a significantly lower number of cases dismissed by parties than
either of the other two circuits. 66 This is unexpected given the theory
that early announcement will encourage parties to settle and therefore
voluntarily dismiss cases. In very basic terms, then, there is no
support for the notion that the cue and response mechanism is
generating its intended effect.
But of course other characteristics of the cases included in the
data set may be contributing to differences in the rates of voluntary
dismissal. In an attempt to account for such characteristics, I coded
two additional variables for each case: subject matter and the
involvement of a governmental entity. The docket sheet includes a
categorization of the appeal by subject matter, which I used to create
the following general categories of appeals: Employment and Labor
(EL), Other Civil Rights (OCR), 67 Personal Injury (PI), Other

66

A comparison of the sample frequency of voluntary dismissals for the District
of Columbia Circuit and the Second Circuit produced a one-sided t-value of 2.2 and
a corresponding p-value of .01. A similar comparison between the District of
Columbia and Seventh Circuit frequencies produced a one-sided t-value of 2.4 and a
p-value of .01.
67
This does not include civil rights-based employment claims, which are
included instead in the EL category.
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Statutory Actions (OS), Contract (CN), and All Other Appeals (O). 68
Involvement of a governmental party is not generally noted explicitly
on the docket sheet. 69 Rather, I coded the data by reviewing the listed
parties. The inclusion of any governmental entity on either side of the
appeal was sufficient to warrant affirmative coding on the
“Government” variable. 70
Subject matter might skew the overall data if the allocation of
cases by subject matter varies across circuits and if the underlying rate
68

“All Other Cases” includes: Securities, Real Property, Intellectual Property,
Antitrust, Environmental, and those characterized by the court as “Other.” The
following table shows the subject matter distribution of cases for each circuit.
Second
Seventh
D.C.
Circuit
Circuit
Circuit
Employment &
54
73
51
(27.0%)
(36.5%)
(25.5%)
Labor
Other Civil
56
47
39
(28.0%)
(23.5%)
(19.5%)
Rights
30
20
15
Contract
(15.0%)
(10.0%)
(7.5%)
18
17
14
Personal Injury
(9.0%)
(8.5%)
(7.0%)
17
18
63
Other Statutory
(8.5%)
(9.0%)
(31.5%)
25
25
18
All Other
(12.5%)
(12.5%)
(9.0%)
200
200
200
Total
(100.0%)
(100.0%)
(100.0%)
69

The exception to that is the D.C. Circuit practice of giving cases involving the
United States government a docket number series that is distinct (XX-5000) from
other civil appeals (XX-7000). So involvement of the federal government as a party
is explicitly categorized by the court, but involvement of other governmental entities
must still be manually extracted from the XX-7000 appeals.
70
That is, suits involving the United States Government as well as the Chicago
Police Department are included as “Government” cases. The following table shows
the distribution of the government involvement variable for each circuit.
Second
Seventh
D.C. Circuit
Circuit
Circuit
55
73
133
Government Party
(27.5%)
(36.5%)
(66.5%)
145
127
67
No Government Party
(72.5%)
(63.5%)
(33.5%)
200
200
200
All Cases
(100.0%)
(100.0%)
(100.0%)
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of voluntary dismissal varies across subject matter categories. This
latter requirement seems plausible. For example, appeals involving
contracts might lead to a higher rate of voluntary dismissal than those
involving civil rights. 71 Similarly, government party involvement may
skew the data if there are variations in that involvement across circuits
and if underlying voluntary dismissal rates vary according to
involvement. Again, it seems at least plausible that settlement may be
more or less likely based on whether a government party is involved. 72
But the voluntary dismissal rate in the D.C. Circuit is not
significantly higher even when accounting for these variables. To get
at this, I ran a binomial logistic regression on the 600 cases in the data
set, using voluntary dismissal as the dependent variable and case
location, subject matter and government involvement as independent
variables. The D.C. Circuit was the default location and All Other
Cases was the default subject matter. The regression results are shown
in Table 2.
Table 2: Binomial Logistic Regression Results
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

Step 1

71

Step
Block
Model

Chi-square
30.690
30.690
30.690

df
8
8
8

Sig.
.000
.000
.000

Individuals asserting civil rights claims are often seeking to have a dignitary
harm formally recognized, and may thus be more resistant to a monetary settlement.
Individuals suing based on contract claims are seeking financial redress, and
settlement may thus be more agreeable. But the direction of the effect is
unimportant to the point being made here, which is that a subject matter effect in any
direction may skew the results based on all data, given the variations in subject
matter distribution across circuits.
72
As an intuitive matter, the presence of a governmental entity should make
settlement less likely because the governmental entity is more likely to be a repeat
player interested in the rule value of having a judicial decision on the books to guide
its future behavior. But the intuition could go the other way. If the governmental
entity is more concerned about the reputational or publicity effects of an adverse
judgment, it may be more willing to settle. As in the case of subject matter effects,
however, the directionality is not the primary concern here. Rather, the existence of
an effect in either direction suggests that the presence of a government party is a
variable that should be controlled in order to get a full understanding of the data.
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Variables in the Equation

Step 1

Seventh
Second
Government
EL
OCR
CN
PI
OS
Constant

B
.543
.452
-.561
-.416
-.770
-.107
.016
.214
-.871

S.E.
.254
.262
.229
.309
.346
.373
.400
.350
.340

Wald
4.553
2.982
5.999
1.810
4.956
.083
.002
.375
6.558

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Sig.
.033
.084
.014
.179
.026
.774
.968
.540
.010

Exp(B)
1.721
1.571
.570
.660
.463
.898
1.016
1.239
.419

These results indicate no support for the proposition that the
D.C. Circuit has higher rates of voluntary dismissal than either the
Second or the Seventh. Were that proposition true, the coefficients for
the Seventh and Second variable should be negative. But the results
are just the opposite – both coefficients are positive, and at least in the
case of the Seventh Circuit, the finding is statistically significant.
2. A Closer Look at the D.C. Circuit
A simple comparison of voluntary dismissal rates across three
circuits fails to show that the D.C. Circuit is generating higher rates of
voluntary dismissal. But some other reason may explain why
voluntary dismissal rates are naturally lower in the D.C. Circuit
relative to the Second and Seventh. Perhaps the D.C. Circuit has
historically had a much lower rate of voluntary settlement, and the rule
has had the effect of closing the gap. Were that the case, then the
comparison of rates across circuits during a single time period may not
capture the effect of the rule. To account for that possibility, this
section looks at the D.C. Circuit data in isolation. 73 Of 200 cases
filed, 41 were voluntarily dismissed by parties – a rate of 20.5%. If all
of those voluntary dismissals were attributable to the early
announcement rule, then the impact in terms of caseload reduction
would fairly be considered significant. That kind of attribution is
surely problematic, however; it simply cannot be the case that all
73

A different methodological approach that would address this possibility is a
differences-in-differences analysis. But such an analysis is complicated here by the
difficulty of compiling the initial time period data.
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dismissals are generated by the rule. Indeed, the pool of cases for
which that explanation is even plausible is substantially smaller. To
state the obvious, early panel announcement is a plausible explanation
for voluntary dismissal only when an announcement has actually been
made prior to dismissal. Of the 41 voluntarily dismissed cases, only
13 satisfy that condition. Relative to the total number of filings, the
rate shrinks from 20.5% to 6.5% when the numerator is adjusted to
account for this timing condition.
But there might be a denominator problem as well. If the goal
is to assess the extent to which an announcement rule influences
litigants, it does not make sense to include other cases where no panel
has been announced. Instead, the denominator should consist only of
cases where the composition of the panel has been revealed to the
parties. Thus, all cases involving an oral argument should be included
along with the 13 cases voluntarily dismissed after a panel
announcement. Beyond that, some but not all of the cases that are
decided without oral argument could be included. Appeals decided
without oral argument take one of two forms. In some cases, the court
grants a motion for summary affirmance; this is done by a panel, but
there is no advance announcement of the composition of that panel
prior to the issuance of the court order. Alternatively, the court may
notify the parties that no oral argument is necessary to decide the case.
In that situation, the panel is revealed to the parties at the same time
that the order to decide the case without oral argument is issued.
Cases of the latter sort meet the announcement condition, but I have
excluded them for several reasons. To begin, the early announcement
procedure is not technically involved in those cases because the panel
is not revealed in association with an oral argument scheduling order.
More importantly, the panel composition is disclosed at the same time
that another, more powerful informational cue is revealed. The fact
that the court plans to decide the case without oral argument is a
strong indication that a judgment affirming the lower court’s decision
is forthcoming. To the extent that any dismissal activity is generated
by a “no oral argument” order, it is likely to be the result of the
substance of the order itself rather than the names of the judges who
issue it. 74
74

But it is hardly surprising that very little dismissal activity actually occurs.
Because the overwhelmingly typical action after a “no oral argument” order is a
judgment without memo affirming the lower court opinion, the direction and the
terms of the court’s forthcoming decision are essentially known. As a result, the
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If the analysis is narrowed to the cases voluntarily dismissed
after an oral argument order relative to the total number of cases in
which an oral argument order was issued, what remains are 13 cases
potentially affected by the rule out of 63 cases involving a panel
announcement. That represents a maximum rate of 20.6% of
announced cases dismissed in response to the rule. To be sure, it is
almost certainly the case that the actual rate is somewhat lower than
this maximum because some cases that settle after panel
announcement may do so for an unrelated reason. There is no way to
disaggregate these cases from those dismissed in direct response to the
panel information. Still, the existence of this pool of 13 cases provides
some tentative support for the notion that some litigants respond to the
early announcement rule and that some settlement activity results.
II. BARRIERS TO EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTIVENESS
Despite the presence of a pool of dismissed cases for which early
panel announcement might provide a plausible explanation, the
general impact of the D.C. Circuit’s procedure does not appear
overwhelming. This Part explores two broad explanations for why
this might be so. The first is cuing failure, which occurs when the
informational cue being provided may not actually be valuable to
litigants in the way that the court expects. The second is response
failure, which results when litigants either ignore or misinterpret panel
announcement information. Modifications to the announcement
procedure that account for these failures should enhance the settlement
effect. But because the court will almost certainly view effective
modifications as unpalatable, information and litigant failures create
intractable barriers to effectiveness in many cases.
A. Cuing Failure
The D.C. Circuit’s early announcement procedure will generate
new settlement behavior only if it provides an effective informational
party standing to benefit from the pending judgment would only accept a settlement
on the same terms as the lower court opinion. Both parties might pursue such an
approach were there savings to be recouped that would outweigh the costs of
negotiating the settlement. But of course, at the point that a “no oral argument”
order is issued, there are basically no litigation costs to be saved by dismissing the
case because all briefs have been filed, and no additional resources need be devoted
to preparation for oral argument.
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cue. Effective in this context means three things. First, the
information contained in the cue must be strong in the sense that it
permits significant updating of expectations regarding likely outcome.
Second, the information contained in the cue must be relevant to the
litigants’ settlement calculations. Third, the information must be
released early enough to provide an opportunity for cost savings. If
any of those conditions does not hold in a given case, then the
information being conveyed will not trigger a response from litigants.
This section discusses situations in which panel announcement
represents an ineffective cue and concludes that few procedural
modifications are available to improve the cue’s effectiveness.
1. Ineffectiveness due to lack of strength
Absent specific panel composition information, litigants should
form a generalized assessment of their prospects based on the overall
composition of the court hearing the appeal. This initial prediction can
be expressed as an expected success calculation of qR*pR + (1-qR)pD,
where qR is the probability of receiving a majority-Republican panel,
and where pR and pD are the anticipated probabilities of success under
majority-Republican and majority-Democratic panels, respectively.75
After the court announces panel composition, the expected success
calculation collapses to either pR or pD. The amount of updating that
panel announcement permits is thus determined by the gap between
qR*pR + (1-qR)pD and pR or pD. Where that gap is small, panel
announcement represents an informational cue with weak content.
Panel composition will often be a weak cue when one
ideological group dominates the court’s overall composition. In this
situation, a litigant’s pre-announcement assessment will be based on
an expectation that the panel will be comprised of a majority from the
dominating party. In most cases, announcement of the actual panel
composition will simply confirm that prediction and will not provide
enough additional information to significantly alter expectations. For
example, imagine a court dominated by Republican judges, such that
qR is very high. A litigant’s pre-announcement expectation in this case
closely resembles pR, and the disclosure of a Republican panel triggers
only a slight modification in expected success. Put differently, panel
composition information leads to greater updating when the expected
panel based on overall court composition is relatively uncertain. As
75

See Revesz, supra note 55, at 692.
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the level of certainty increases, the value added by announcing panel
composition decreases.
As a practical matter, there is not much reason to believe that
informational failure of this sort played a significant role in the D.C.
Circuit, at least not during the time period covered by the data. During
that time, the D.C. Circuit was composed of six active judges
appointed by Republican presidents and four active judges appointed
by Democratic presidents. Given that distribution, the probability of
getting a majority-Republican panel – that is, qR – was .67. 76
Introduction of accurate panel composition information in that
situation should lead to significant updating with respect to predicted
outcomes that would be useful to litigants. 77 In any event, the court is
not in a position to combat this particular form of informational
weakness because it can not easily alter its ideological composition. 78
Two other forms of informational weakness are more plausible
in the context of the D.C. Circuit. First, panel announcement
represents a weak informational cue when the panel itself is not
particularly predictable. Early announcement is valuable because it
clarifies the likely outcome. But certain panels are likely to be quite
unpredictable, and in those cases the clarification provided by panel
announcement is minimal. Second, panel announcement conveys
weak information when litigants do not perceive the outcome of their
appeal to be particularly sensitive to panel composition. These are
cases in which pR and pD are very similar, meaning that the bold
76

If nR is the number of Republican judges in a ten judge pool, then the
probability of receiving a majority-Republican panel is given by nR(nR-1)(14nR)/360. Admittedly, this number is not entirely accurate, because senior judges are
part of the assignment pool as well, although they sit with less frequency than active
judges.
77
The expected outcome would shift from the pre-announcement expected
success calculation, qR*pR + (1-qR)pD, to either pR or pD, depending on the panel
announced. Since qR is only .67 here, this shift should be significant in cases where
pR and pD are not very close. And where pR and pD are very close, panel
announcement is unlikely to generate much settlement activity for reasons described
later in this section.
78
Of course, judges can contribute to a change in the overall composition of the
court by retiring or by taking senior status, either of which would permit the
nomination of a new judge. But this is obviously a limited and blunt instrument for
changing the court’s ideological composition. Judges might also change their own
ideology to create greater ideological diversity. Although ideological shifts are not
unprecedented, it seems far-fetched indeed to imagine that a judge would
consciously choose this course in order to improve the effectiveness of early panel
announcement.

Early Panel Announcement

29

predictions of the attitudinal model are not borne out in the actual
expectations of litigants. The pool of such cases might be sizable. An
overwhelming percentage of appellate decisions are unanimous, which
seems to imply that composition does not matter all that much in the
run of cases. 79 If litigants understand the prevalence of unanimity,
their expectations regarding outcome may not be responsive to panel
composition. 80 If the appellee and appellant expect outcomes that are
significantly different, then appeals may still be filed. But the addition
of panel announcement information will result in minimal updating.
If these forms of informational weakness are widespread, the
court might strengthen its cue by encouraging a greater variance
between pre- and post-announcement predictions.
Producing
decisions that are more predictable and less unanimous should achieve
this goal. But aside from the possibility of disingenuousness, this
approach imposes a cost on judges, who would have to write more
dissents. The court’s goal of managing judicial workload would thus
be undermined. Another alternative is to convince litigants through
less costly means that panel composition actually matters in most
cases. But for reasons discussed shortly, such efforts are unlikely. 81

79

A focus on unanimous voting may underestimate the actual extent of
ideological disagreement on the court because some portion of unanimous cases
reflect “getting along” behavior by judges who disagree slightly but not enough to
expend the effort and the goodwill to register that disagreement in a formal dissent.
See Jason J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An
Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 65 Maryland L. Rev. ___ (2006)
(forthcoming).
80
From the litigant’s perspective, the prevalence of unanimity may be a signal
that although the attitudinal model explains some judicial behavior, it doesn’t
explain much. What’s more, because it may be difficult for a litigant to predict
before the fact which cases will be explained, the attitudinal model may not be
operative in practice as a basis for litigant decisionmaking. Even so, I am not
claiming here that the reality of unanimity requires litigants to reach such a
conclusion. Quite to the contrary, it is almost certainly true that many litigants
perceive significant panel distinctions regardless of reality. My only point is that
there may be a body of cases for which litigants do not perceive panel effects, and
for those cases the impact of the panel announcement cue will be minimal.
81
For a fuller discussion of the court’s almost certain hesitance to embrace an
active role in promoting the attitudinal model of judging, see text accompanying
notes 89-91.

Early Panel Announcement

30

2. Ineffectiveness due to lack of relevance
In the paradigmatic case, a plaintiff seeks something from the
defendant that the defendant could provide but would prefer not to.
Money is a fitting example of the thing at issue, although demands
such as promotions in employment cases or admission to school in
affirmative action cases also fit. Ultimately, settlement is plausible
because both parties have an interest in minimizing costs and because
the plaintiff does not particularly care whether the thing sought is
provided by agreement or by court order. But some cases are
different. Consider for example a plaintiff who wants a judgment
officially entered against a defendant to satisfy a desire to have
wrongdoing publicly and officially acknowledged. The key difference
here is that the defendant is not in a position to readily provide that
which the plaintiff seeks. The plaintiff is not interested in a thing that
can be awarded by judgment, but is instead interested in a judgment
per se. Settlement may not be possible in such cases even if both
parties agree on the likely outcome and even if significant costs can be
saved. 82 As a result, the disclosure of panel information will produce
no effect – even if it clarifies the likely outcome – because it is not
relevant to the litigant’s decisions. As with weak cues, the court
cannot easily remedy an irrelevant cue because nothing short of a
judgment will satisfy the parties.
3. Ineffectiveness due to insufficient cost savings
A final possibility is that panel announcement has limited
effect due to the timing of its release. Even though announcement in
the D.C. Circuit comes very early in relative terms, it still may not
come early enough in the process to make significant cost savings
available. As Richard Revesz has pointed out, if the ratio of preannouncement litigation costs to total litigation costs is sufficiently
high, then “announcing the panel before all the litigation costs have
been expended is equivalent to announcing it after all such costs have
82

To be clear, I am not making a general claim here about cases involving nonmonetary remedies. In many such cases a plaintiff will readily accept money instead
of the non-monetary remedy being sought. Rather, the point is that some litigants
may be hesitant to do so, and that an interest in a judgment per se can make
settlement less likely. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 434 (2004).
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been expended.” 83 The question then is whether the announcement
comes early enough to offer the prospect of cost savings that will
outweigh the costs of negotiating the settlement. The D.C. Circuit’s
procedure generally reveals panel composition before briefing is
completed, and in these instances appreciable cost savings should be
available. But occasionally the announcement is made after briefs
have been filed, and in those cases the available cost savings may be
quite low (primarily the costs of preparing for and conducting oral
argument).
To improve the impact of the panel composition cue, the court
could move the announcement to an earlier stage of the appeals
process. This would increase the savings that post-announcement
settlement provides. At a minimum, the court should ensure that
announcement always precedes the completion of briefing. Other
more dramatic options include announcing panel composition at the
time that a notice of appeal is filed or even at the time that a lower
court reaches a final judgment. Although these latter approaches
would maximize available cost savings, they have the potential to
backfire. Very early release of panel composition presents an
opportunity for prospective appellants to obtain valuable information
about likely outcome at a very low price, and that may draw parties
into the appeals process who would otherwise steer clear. 84 Put
differently, early announcement produces two countervailing effects.
Many cases that would appeal regardless of the announcement
procedure may settle after the panel is announced, reducing the
number of cases that the court must decide. But some cases that are
appealed precisely because of the announcement procedure may not
settle after the panel is announced, thereby increasing that number of
cases. If the latter group is larger than the former, the move toward
83

See Revesz, supra note 55, at 697. In cases where relatively few costs would
be saved by pursuing a settlement, a party may decide to carry out an appeal
notwithstanding the announcement of an unfavorable panel. That decision could
result because the cost of conducting the settlement negotiations is equal to or
greater than the cost of completing the appeal, or because the party makes a
calculated decision to pay the relatively minimal additional fees to carry out the
appeal to purchase an option on the possibility that the appeal will defy prediction.
84
See id. at 696-97. Indeed, Revesz suggests that as a theoretical matter this
effect should already be occurring. Id. at 709 (“[T]he D.C. Circuit practice induces
the litigation of cases that would not be pursued at all under the majority practice.”).
But it is difficult to assess whether theory has been translated into practice based on
the data discussed in Part I.B because there is no reliable way to discern whether a
given appeal would have been filed in the absence of the announcement regime.
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earlier announcement will ultimately make the judges’ adjudicative
burden worse rather than better. 85
B. Response Failure
The previous section discussed conditions in which the court’s
informational cue may fail to alter litigant behavior because the cue
itself is ineffective. This section addresses conditions under which
settlement activity may fail to occur even where the cue qualifies as
effective in the abstract. The conventional model of settlement
behavior discussed in Part I.A assumes that both sides of a dispute
treat information rationally.86 When new information is introduced,
both sides are expected to process it accurately and integrate it into an
updated outcome prediction. But the assumption of rational behavior
that pervades economic models of litigant behavior has been the
subject of steady attack over the past twenty years. If the rationality
assumption does not hold, then the introduction of new information
may not contribute to increased settlement activity.
Three things must occur for a litigant to rationally process the
informational cue that the D.C. Circuit provides. The litigant must
first notice that a cue has been provided, must then recognize that the
cue contains relevant information, and must finally integrate that
information accurately to form a new prediction of likely outcome.
Errors that occur in the first two steps can sensibly be grouped
together, and I will refer to both as ignorance errors. Litigants making
85

As noted by Revesz, there is no way to predict theoretically which group of
cases will be larger. See id. at 708. Also, it is important here to distinguish between
the burden on the judges in particular and the burden on the court more generally.
Even if earlier announcement leads to fewer cases that proceed to merits panels, the
shift to earlier announcement might still increase the burden on the court due to the
increased number of appeals filed in response to the cheap availability of relevant
information. But increasing the overall burden on the court while reducing the
burden on judges might be a sensible tradeoff, given that it is relatively easier (and
less expensive) to modify non-judge staffing levels.
Ultimately, I am not as concerned with the particulars of the relative magnitudes
of these effects as I am with discerning whether the cue and response model
produces effects at all. If Revesz is right, then the early announcement procedure
may have the effect of increasing the number of appeals filed. But there still should
be settlement activity generated, and that settlement activity will be influenced by
the barriers discussed here and will create distortions of the sort discussed in Part III.
86
See Priest & Klein, supra note 52, at 4 (“The most important assumption of
the model is that potential litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision.”).
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ignorance errors do not respond to the informational cue, either
because they do not notice it or because they wrongly consider it
beside the point. 87 In contrast, errors that occur at the final step arise
because parties attempt to respond to the informational cue but make
mistakes when doing so. Missteps made while processing new
information are common, and here they may inhibit the cue’s
effectiveness by contributing to skewed interpretations of its impact on
likely outcome.
1. Ignorance errors
Ignorance errors result when a party does not notice that a cue
has been provided, or when the party notices the cue but fails to
recognize that it contains relevant information. The manner in which
the court’s informational cue is conveyed contributes to the existence
of ignorance errors. Three general models are possible, which I will
refer to as models of availability, disclosure and publicity. In an
availability model, the court makes information available but leaves it
up to the parties to acquire the information. In a disclosure model, the
court makes the information available and takes the additional step of
affirmatively providing that information to the litigants. In a publicity
model, the court not only discloses the information to the parties but
also emphasizes its importance and relevance.
As an intuitive matter, ignorance errors presumably decrease as
the court becomes more active in transmitting the informational cue.
A relatively attentive and engaged litigant who constantly and
rationally updates expectations regarding likely outcome may
nevertheless miss a cue if it is only available upon inquiry. This is
particularly true if the litigant is unfamiliar with the peculiarities of a
court’s practice and procedure and therefore unaware that a source of
potentially relevant information exists. Disclosure in these cases
would remedy ignorance errors. Similarly, publicity may cure
87

In some cases, it may be true that the composition of the panel is unrelated to
the outcome of the appeal; for instance, in cases clearly governed by a binding
Supreme Court precedent. If parties in those cases fail to update their outcome
predictions in response to panel announcement, they should not be considered
irrational (although some other source of irrational behavior might explain why an
appeal was filed at all in those circumstances). Instead, the irrational moniker
applies only in those cases where updating would be possible, but is not even
attempted because of a failure to recognize the informational cue provided by the
panel announcement.
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ignorance errors if there is a class of litigants who would update
predictions in response to relevant information but who fail to
recognize the relevance of a given piece of information.
The D.C. Circuit’s early announcement procedure is an
example of a disclosure-style cue. The cue is conveyed by including
the names of the judges who will compose the panel in the order
scheduling oral argument. Because the parties receive that order
directly, the cue is affirmatively presented rather than simply made
available. But because the court does not highlight the information or
explain its potential importance, litigants themselves must draw
appropriate conclusions from the disclosure.
An obvious way for the D.C. Circuit to improve the
procedure’s effectiveness is to shift from a disclosure model toward a
publicity model. This shift might take various forms. The most subtle
change would disclose the information in an isolated order. When
many pieces of information are conveyed at once, there is an increased
likelihood that some of the information will be overlooked or
misunderstood by the recipient. 88 Here, litigants may focus on other
information conveyed in the oral argument order – e.g., the date of the
argument and the time allocated to each side – and thus may fail to
take proper notice of panel composition. Conveying composition in
an isolated order should therefore improve the likelihood that litigants
will detect the cue and consider its potential relevance. This shift is
attractive because it costs very little and because judges are unlikely to
view it as objectionable on other grounds. Realistically, however, the
class of litigants who would notice and respond to panel composition
when conveyed in isolation but who fail to notice and respond when
conveyed along with other information is almost certainly quite small.
For that reason, isolated disclosure ultimately looks like a modification
that is agreeable but without much bite.
To have more bite, the shift toward publicity needs to be more
drastic. One possibility is to accompany disclosure of panel
composition information with a court notice indicating that litigants
may find the disclosure useful in settlement negotiations. A second
possibility is disclosure accompanied by a detailed report of how the
88

For discussions of this phenomenon in other contexts, see Richard Craswell,
Taking Disclosure Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law
and Elsewhere, 92 VIRGINIA L. REV. 565, 581-86 (2006); Troy A. Paredes, Blinded
by the Light: Information Overload and its Consequences for Securities Regulation,
81 WASH. U. L. Q. 417, 441-44 (2003).
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assigned panel has voted in past cases. Either of these options would
take the court firmly into the territory of a publicity model and would
improve the extent to which litigants notice the composition
information and recognize its importance. Indeed, either of the
approaches just discussed should come close to eliminating existing
ignorance errors.
Even so, the D.C. Circuit is unlikely to embrace such
alternatives because they are unattractive for other reasons. As
discussed in Part I.A, judges are generally careful to publicly adopt
formalist stances and to resist any admission that judicial
characteristics affect judicial decisions. In the context of the federal
courts of appeals, there are at least two reasons to explain that
behavior. First, judges may consider the formalist view as crucial to
public acceptance of the independent judiciary. Along these lines,
Judge Wald has emphasized that “[f]or our citizens to have confidence
in the courts’ decisions, they must be convinced that judges are
impartial as to litigants, including the state, and that we are not
embarked on personal ideological crusades.” 89 A second reason is
unique to the appellate context. Appeals courts alone in the federal
system must support a fiction of a unified court composed of judges
who decide individual cases in randomly assigned panels. 90
Intuitively, that distinction seems a likely source of pressure to keep
up appearances of formality because acknowledgments of attitudinal
effects can destabilize the fiction of the unified court.
Indeed, even Judge Edwards’s support for the early
announcement procedure is hedged by a simultaneous desire to
maintain a formalist posture. Rather than arguing that early
announcement should promote settlement because it will actually
provide useful information to litigants, Judge Edwards bases his
support on a claim that litigants will mistakenly perceive that the
89

Patricia M. Wald, Some Real-Life Observations About Judging, 26 IND. L.
REV. 173, 182 (1992).
90
The district courts lack the characteristic of a unified court because they are
not bound by decisions reached by other judges in the same court. The Supreme
Court lacks the characteristic of permutation because it is composed of a single panel
that hears all cases. Having said that, the Supreme Court confronts this difficulty to
some extent because the composition of its single panel changes over time. But the
passage of time itself provides a natural alternative explanation for the Court to
explain different outcomes that are reached in similar cases without having to
acknowledge that differences in Court composition may be at least equally
influential.
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information is useful. 91 By crafting the argument in this way, Judge
Edwards can support both the early announcement procedure and the
formalist model of judging. But this argument makes sense only if the
court limits its role to the disclosure of the panel announcement cue.
If the court instead becomes actively involved in instructing litigants
about the cue’s potential relevance, it becomes nearly impossible to
keep up the ghost of judicial formalism. In short, the court is likely to
view a meaningful move toward publicity as an acknowledgment that
the attitudinal model has merit. Such an admission would almost
certainly constitute an unacceptable price to pay to improve the
operation of the early announcement procedure, regardless of its
potential effect.
2. Perception errors
Perception errors result when litigants notice the informational
cue and respond to it, but make mistakes when doing so. As an
example, numerous studies demonstrate that individuals have a
“persistent tendency to integrate new information in a self-serving
fashion.” 92 As a result of this confirmatory or self-serving bias, the
disclosure of identical information may not lead to updated predictions
in different directions. Law students, for instance, interpret factual
information related differently if they are assigned a hypothetical side
to represent before the information is disclosed. 93 Under the
traditional law-and-economics theory, appeals are filed when there is a
91

See supra note 19 and accompanying text (referring to a “false assumption” or
“false image” as the basis for procedure’s effect).
92
Samuel Issacharoff, The Content of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get
Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1265, 1285 (2002). For a more general discussion
of the self-serving bias, see, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption From Law and
Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1093 (2000); Linda Babcock et al., Biased
Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337, 1342 (1995);
George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 157-59 (1993). For psychological studies
detailing the “self-serving bias,” see Charles G. Lord, et al., Biased Assimilation and
Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered
Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098 (1979); Dale Griffin & Amos
Tversky, The Weighing of Evidence and the Determinants of Confidence, 24
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 411 (1992).
93
Babcock et. al., supra note 92, at 1342; Loewenstein et. al., supra note 92, at
151-52.
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difference between the appellant and appellee regarding likely
outcome. 94 The theory underlying the D.C. Circuit procedure is that
disclosure of panel composition information may close that gap and
thus make settlement between the two parties possible in some cases.
But if the self-serving bias affects integration of panel information,
then the gap between the parties may be unchanged and may even
expand after the court provides an informational cue. 95
As with ignorance errors, the most obvious way for the court to
address these errors is to move toward publicity. Again, the court
might accompany the disclosure of panel composition information
with a detailed analysis of what the information might imply. That
analysis might itself be subject to a self-serving bias, but the potential
for that bias should decrease when the space to interpret new
information in varying ways shrinks. In other words, if the
implications of new information are made explicit when disclosed,
litigants are less able to create an interpretation that simply confirms
pre-existing preferences. Instead, the greater risk would be that
litigants may fall victim to an overconfidence bias that would lead
them to believe that their case is an outlier.96 A different approach
that may avoid these problems is to couple disclosure of panel
composition information with a required settlement conference. This
requirement would contribute to a more objective interpretation of the
information because it would force litigants to confront alternative
interpretations of the information that they might otherwise neglect. 97
In either case, the court is again thrust into a position of
combating errors by adopting a more active role in the dissemination
of its informational cue. This highlights a general difficulty. Because
a publicity model provides the greatest opportunity for the court to
control how litigants interpret and respond to its cue, it is the optimal
approach for minimizing perception errors, however they arise. At the
94

See Priest & Klein, supra note 52, at 12; see also Robert D. Cooter & Daniel
Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 3 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1067 (1989).
95
See Issacharoff, supra note 92, at 1285 (“Rather than bringing parties
together, mutually shared common information can provide a fertile environment for
disagreement and inefficient impasses.”).
96
For a discussion of the overconfidence bias, see Korobkin & Ulen, supra note
92, at 1091-93.
97
See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 92, at 1094 (suggesting that the self-serving
bias “provides support for legal structures that require litigating parties to view the
facts of a dispute through the eyes of their opponents”).
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same time, for reasons previously explained, a move toward a
publicity model is not viable because it requires a level of
interventionism beyond that which the court will accept. In short, the
court is almost certainly unwilling to move beyond a disclosure model,
and that unwillingness means that the court must leave the
interpretation of the cue almost entirely in the hands of litigants – and
must accept perception errors when they occur.
In sum, the D.C. Circuit might address both ignorance and
perception errors by changing the way it conveys panel announcement
information. But significant movement from the status quo toward a
publicity model is unlikely. A slight move in the form of isolated
disclosure would be potentially acceptable but ineffective. Any
greater move is likely to butt up against the court’s interest in
maintaining a perception of panel neutrality, and is thus potentially
effective but unacceptable. Accordingly, existing ignorance and
perception errors are an intractable hindrance to the success of an early
announcement procedure, at least in terms of settlement promotion.
The implications for that intractability are taken up in Part III.
III. DISTORTIONS CREATED BY EARLY ANNOUNCEMENT
The preceding discussion suggested various barriers that
impede the effectiveness of the D.C. Circuit’s early announcement
cue, and concluded that procedural modifications to address those
barriers are likely to be either ineffective or unacceptable. This Part
examines how those barriers might affect the procedure’s operation in
practice. In particular, it describes and evaluates three ways that the
procedure distorts the body of cases reaching oral argument. None of
these distortions are likely to be dramatic or extreme. But each may
have marginal effects on the content of cases that proceed to a merits
decision, and on the way that those cases are presented to and decided
by their assigned panels.
A. The Predictability Distortion
If early announcement works at all, it works best and most
often in cases where the cue is strong, that is, where the panel
announcement gives litigants a strong indication of likely outcome.
Predictability distortions exist because the strength of panel
information is not uniform and varies based on the predictability of the
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judges and the predictability of the legal issues involved. Because of
these irregularities, the procedure affects the types of cases that
proceed to oral argument and the composition of the panels who hear
them. In particular, early announcement maximizes updating and the
creation of new settlement zones when litigants perceive the
announced panel to be particularly predictable. Conversely, settlement
is less likely when the announced cue is perceived to be unpredictable.
As a result, an early announcement procedure should be expected to
increase the extent to which oral argument cases involve unpredictable
panels. 98
Polk Wagner and Lee Petherbridge have articulated precisely
this expectation. After analyzing voting patterns and approaches to
claim construction in the Federal Circuit, Wagner and Petherbridge
first conclude that although many members of the court are
predictable, about half do not have “predictable effects on outcomes
when empanelled.” 99 Based on this predictability divide, they then
predict that an early announcement procedure would result in a “larger
proportion of opinions [would be] decided by panels (and written by
judges) that are less predictable.” 100 And because they believe that
this by-product of the procedure “could have long-term negative
effects on the overall performance of the court,” they ultimately
caution against its adoption. 101
Wagner and Petherbridge do not provide an account for their
jurisprudential concern, instead asserting the “long-term negative
effects” as something of a given. But it is easy to imagine such effects
in the extreme case. If the effect of the procedure is very dramatic, the
court will appear to be pre-announcing results in many cases when it
announces panels. This is efficient, perhaps, 102 but unsatisfactory in
light of the two traditional aims of a judicial system. 103 To begin,
98

To be a bit more precise, what should really be expected is that oral argument
cases should involve relatively more panels that are perceived by litigants to be
unpredictable.
99
Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 21, at 1175.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
It may not even be efficient, for reasons discussed infra at notes 85.
103
Virtually every theory of adjudication recognizes that a judicial system must
serve two general goals, which Chad Oldfather has recently referred to as “points of
fundamental agreement” in contemporary discussions of adjudication and
adjudicative duty. Chad M. Oldfather, Defining Judicial Inactivism, 94 GEO L.J.
121, 137 (2005). First, a judicial system must provide an outlet for dispute
resolution. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 Stan. L.
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when the court resolves disputes by pre-announcing results, there is no
caselaw created to guide behavior and reduce the need for future resort
to the legal system. More importantly, the manner of resolving
disputes is itself problematic because litigants will view it as random
and unfair. Although fairness has been viewed as “of secondary
importance” relative to the need for the system to guarantee resolution
that is peaceful, 104 perceptions of unfairness can be devastating
because litigants are unlikely to submit to an unfair system
voluntarily. 105 Over time, the procedure threatens to cultivate a
perception of illegitimacy because litigants are deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the dispute resolution
process. 106
For the reasons discussed in Part II, however, this concern is
unrealistic because the procedure will almost certainly never produce
Rev. 937, 937-38 (1975). The judicial system can act only when presented with a
dispute, and as a result resolution of disputes is in many ways a court’s archetypal
function. I will refer to this function as the court’s “dispute resolution function.”
But of course that is not all that a judicial system does, nor all that we expect it to do.
Instead, courts – and particularly appellate courts – issue opinions not only to
formalize the resolution of the dispute (and perhaps to legitimize that resolution by
convincing the litigants that their participation was regarded, see Lon L. Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 388 (1978)), but also to
establish legal rules that will shape and govern the behavior of parties not privy to
the specific dispute being resolved. See Oldfather, supra at 137-38. I will refer to
this as the court’s “caselaw production function.” Disagreement – sometimes fierce
disagreement – exists as to the relative importance of these two functions, but the
dual nature of adjudication is not in much dispute. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen,
Bureaucratic Organizations and the Theory of Adjudication, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
1-7 (1985).
104
See, Scott, supra note 103, at 937 (“[I]t is more important for society that the
dispute be settled peaceably than that it be settled in any particular way.”).
105
See Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary
System, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 304 (1989) (noting that a system that resolves disputes in
an arbitrary way would not be perceived as fair, and that “[c]itizens would not
voluntarily submit to such a system”). To be sure, the resolution of disputes here is
not quite as random as the proverbial coin flip because the outcome does bear some
relationship to the overall composition of the court, which might in turn be related to
some notion of public representation. Even so, the resolution is random enough to
raise unfairness concerns.
106
Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 277-81
(2004). To be sure, formal participatory rights exist here, and we might not credit
claims of illegitimacy from those who have opted not to exercise them. At the same
time, there is cause for concern if the reason that litigants are opting out is that they
perceive no possibility that their input will influence the court’s decision.
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an extreme effect. And indeed these kinds of extreme difficulties do
not appear to be what Wagner and Petherbridge are getting at when
they decry the increased influence of unpredictable judges and panels.
Instead, their claim seems subtler. Predictability is commonly viewed
as one of the “essential factors in the proper operation of the rule of
law.” 107 If the rule increases the number of cases decided by
unpredictable panels and judges, we might expect the level of
unpredictability in the caselaw to rise as well. In other words, the
claim is that the announcement procedure would ultimately threaten
the stability and coherence of the caselaw, which outweighs any
possible benefit the procedure might have in terms of caseload
reduction.
Despite the intuitive appeal of that account, there is reason to
question its legitimacy. Consider again the “panel effects” studies by
Revesz, Sunstein and others discussed in Part I, and particularly the
impact of “group polarization.” 108 Group polarization describes the
process by which groups of like-minded individuals reinforce and
amplify each other’s judgments. When this occurs, the result of
deliberation is that “groups end up adopting a more extreme version of
their predeliberation tendencies.” 109 Applied to the context of
appellate decisionmaking, group polarization may help to explain why
panels consisting exclusively of members of one ideological group
vote in ways that are more extreme than those containing an
ideological mix. If no panel effects existed, we would expect there to
be no difference in outcomes between one panel composed of three
predictable conservatives and another composed of two predictable
conservatives and a predictable liberal (or an unpredictable). In both
cases, the two predictable conservatives should outvote the remaining
member, thereby making that third member irrelevant. But as an
107

Larry D. Thompson Jr., Adrift On A Sea Of Uncertainty: Preserving
Uniformity In Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference To The Federal Circuit,
92 GEO. L.J. 523, 589 (2004). See also Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About
Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 758 (1982).
108
See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
109
Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 340. Three primary explanations for the
group polarization phenomenon have been suggested: (1) People inclined to a
position will have that position reinforced and head in a more extreme direction
when all members of the group share a similar initial position; (2) Members of a
group seek the approval of the other members and will air their opinion in a way
favorable to the other members of the group; and (3) The similarity of view points in
a group lends confidence to an individual member’s ideas and therefore enables a
more confident assertion of extreme ideas. Id. at 341-343.
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empirical matter, that third member seems to matter after all, as
ideologically split panels vote differently than ideologically uniform
ones.
The impact of ideological amplification is not limited to
voting. Although extremely difficult to measure, the suspicion is that
the content of written judicial opinions may be affected by ideological
amplification as well. 110 Along those lines, Emerson Tiller and Frank
Cross have suggested that the presence of a non-uniform viewpoint
can significantly affect the terms of an opinion, even if that viewpoint
is not expressed in the form of a formal dissent. 111 Part of the
explanation for that may be that the writing judge responds to the
threat of a dissent, and consciously moderates the opinion from a more
extreme form in order to achieve unanimity. But perhaps even more
plausible is that no conscious moderation occurs; instead, the opinion
is less extreme because the presence of ideological diversity naturally
moderates the decisionmaking of the drafter. In either case, the end
result is that ideological amplification may impact the performance of
a panel’s dispute resolution function (by affecting the direction in
which a dispute is decided) as well as its caselaw production function
(by affecting the terms of the opinion expressing that decision).
The possibility of group polarization and ideological
amplification forms the basis for Cass Sunstein’s recent arguments in
favor of ideological diversity on panels.112 Panels composed of judges
representing varying viewpoints are more likely to identify the correct
outcome in cases where one outcome is clearly preferable, and are
more likely to reach a moderate outcome in cases where no clearly
preferable outcome exists. In cases where there is a clearly correct
outcome, “[t]he existence of diversity on a three-judge panel is likely
to bring that fact to light and to move the panel’s decision in the
direction of what the law actually requires. The existence of
politically diverse judges, and of a potential dissenter-whistleblower,
increases the chance that the law will be followed.” 113 In cases where
the correct outcome is less clear, we might also benefit from
ideological diversity, either because “through that route more
110

See Cross & Tiller, supra note 48, at 2156-2157. See also Sunstein et al.,
supra note 109, at 309.
111
See Cross & Tiller, supra note 48, at 2174.
112
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003); Sunstein et
al., supra note 48, at 353.
113
Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 185. See also Cross & Tiller, supra note 48,
at 2172.
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(reasonable) opinions are likely to be heard,”114 or because the varying
viewpoints will have a “moderating effect” that is desirable in cases of
genuine uncertainty. 115 In short, diversity of viewpoints improves the
accuracy and consistency of the court’s decisionmaking when viewed
as a whole.
But even if ideological diversity on panels is considered
desirable in theory, it is difficult to guarantee in practice. The
fundamental problem is that a project of creating ideologically diverse
panels is in direct tension with the current practice of random
assignment. 116 Although serious proposals have been suggested that
deviate from random assignment in the pursuit of ideological
diversity, 117 garnering support for those proposals is difficult because
114

Sunstein et al., supra note 48, at 186.
Id. (“[I]f we are genuinely uncertain about what judges should do, we have
reason to favor a mix of views merely by virtue of its moderating effect. In the face
of uncertainty, sensible people choose between the poles.”).
116
As an alternative solution to systematic deviation from random assignment,
Sunstein has suggested that the Senate step up its “advice and consent” role in an
effort to promote diversity in the federal judiciary. Id. at 189-90. In the current
climate, this seems politically implausible. But plausibility aside, Sunstein’s
suggestion remains unsatisfactory at the level of the appellate courts because an
ideologically diverse pool of appellate judges can still generate ideologically
uniform panels (although it is true that a diverse pool is less likely to do so). In
short, imposition of ideological diversity at the nomination and confirmation stage is
best suited for the Supreme Court, where the pool and the panel are identical.
117
Two possibilities have been suggested. Emerson Tiller and Frank Cross have
proposed an assignment procedure that explicitly takes account of judicial ideology
in an effort to create balanced panels. Tiller & Cross, supra note 48. The authors
note that in 1992 the chance of getting a politically split panel by random assignment
was only 58%. Id. at 227. The probability of getting a three-Republican panel was
41%, while the probability of getting a three-Democrat panel was only about 1%.
Furthermore, they cite recent studies indicating that ideological voting is especially
pronounced in cases where the “circuit court panel is unified with like-minded
partisans (3-0 panels of Democratic or Republican appointees).” Tiller & Cross,
supra note 47, at 215, citing Cross & Tiller, supra note 48, at 2168-72. To
counteract these effects, they suggest a method for selection that would guarantee at
least one member from each party on every appellate panel. This method entails
selecting one judge from each political party – again, as measured by the party of the
nominating President – and then choosing a third judge from all of the remaining
judges. “The result would be all split panels, with the ratio of majority party panels
dependent on the ratio within the circuit as a whole.” Tiller & Cross, supra note 47,
at 232-234. For a criticism of this proposal, see Patricia M. Wald, Colloquy: A
Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 235 (1999).
Alternatively, Michael Hasday has suggested a complex assignment system
based on the expressed preferences of the litigants. Hasday, supra note 47, at 291.
115
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they require the court itself to play an active part in addressing the
problematic influence of attitudinal effects. 118
The distortion created by non-uniform panel predictability may
offer a roundabout solution. Because the announcement of less
predictable panels is less likely to lead to settlement, and because
those less predictable panels are more likely to be ideologically
diverse, the procedure should encourage ideological diversity on
panels that ultimately decide cases and write opinions.119 And it

That proposal avoids an explicit recognition that the politics of judges matter, but
might still lead to panel assignments that are more neutral than random assignment.
In her criticism of the Tiller & Cross proposal, Judge Wald expressed concern that
the explicit acknowledgment of a politicized judiciary would “change[] radically the
public’s and the judge’s own perception of her role.” Wald, supra at 254-55. By
contrast, Hasday’s approach attempts to “avoid[] any explicit mixing of politics with
the judiciary.” Hasday, supra at 306.
Technically, the goal of those proposals is to achieve neutral panels rather than
ideologically diverse ones. But the two goals would almost certainly overlap. In the
Tiller and Cross proposal, the overlap is explicit, at least to the extent that
ideological diversity is achieved by composing panels of judges from both parties.
See Tiller & Cross, supra note 43. In the Hasday proposal, the overlap is not explicit
but is very likely. By responding to litigant preferences, which if rational and
accurate should be as ideologically opposed as possible, the proposal should promote
ideological diversity. See Hasday, supra note 47.
118
The Tiller and Cross proposal requires the most explicit acknowledgment,
and that aspect of the proposal was an important basis for Judge Wald’s criticism.
See Wald, supra note 117. Given the strong judicial defense of formalism and
neutrality, see text accompanying notes 30-30, other judges are likely to react
similarly. The Hasday proposal is perhaps less problematic in this regard because it
consciously avoids explicit recognition of ideological effects through the mechanism
of “matching” panels based on expressed party preferences. See Hasday, supra note
47. Even so, the proposal must be administered by the court, and the basis (or at
least the likely perceived basis) for using its complex assignment mechanism rather
than random assignment would be as a means of addressing ideological effects.
119
A difference between composition in the voluntary dismissal cases and oral
argument cases would support the concept of a predictability distortion. Along those
lines, consider again the data discussed in Part I.B. The following table shows the
panel composition of D.C. Circuit cases dismissed by party and those proceeding to
oral argument, as well as the expected distribution given the overall court
composition.
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should do so without requiring excessive active participation by the
court. 120 If so, the concern expressed by Wagner and Petherbridge is
misplaced. In short, the distortion created by non-uniform panel
predictability may ultimately provide a jurisprudential benefit in the
form of opinions that are more accurate, more restrained, and more
consistent from the perspective of the court as a whole. 121

RRR
RRD
RDD
DDD
Total

Dismissed
by Party
2
(15.4%)
6
(46.2%)
5
(38.5%)
1
(7.7%)
13
(99.9%)

Oral
Argument
5
(10.2%)
25
(51.0%)
13
(26.5%)
6
(12.2%)
49
(100.0%)

Expected
16.7%
50.0%
30.0%
3.3%
100.0%

Obviously, the sample size is small enough that these results are not statistically
significant; a larger scale study might provide a better sense of the existence and
practical effect of a predictability distortion.
120
Obviously the court is still required to participate in the form of announcing
the panel composition. But this level of participation is not likely to be considered
as problematic, perhaps because the court can plausibly claim to be providing the
information for unrelated reasons (e.g., Edwards’ “convenience of the parties”
explanation, supra note 18), or perhaps because the court is not altering its
assignment practices in response to attitudinal effects.
121
Richard Revesz has suggested yet another possibility: In some cases,
announcement of a very predictable panel may not lead to greater settlement activity
at all. Instead, the favored party may opt to pursue the appeal and make more
extreme arguments in the hope of getting a particularly favorable opinion that will be
useful in future cases. See Revesz, supra note 55, at 700-01. This would imply that
the expectation of a predictability-based distortion is misguided. But this response is
more likely where the favored party is a repeat player with an interest in the rule
value created by an appeal. A one-time player interest only in the judgment should
maximize utility by pursuing settlement. In other words, what Revesz’ insight really
captures is differences in the way litigants will respond to panel announcement based
on their ultimate interest in the appeal. For more on this, see infra Part III.C.
At least two other effects created by the predictability distortion are
possible. First, the distortion can mislead potential litigants. When cases settle in
response to the announcement of a predictable panel, the panel’s vote on the legal
issues represented by the appeal is effectively not recorded. In essence, the panel
performs its conflict resolution function without getting a chance to perform its
caselaw production function. The effect is similar to a panel choosing to file a short
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B. The Sophistication Distortion
A second distortion is created by the existence of ignorance and
perception errors, 122 and more specifically by the fact that those errors
are not likely to be evenly distributed across litigants. Instead,
litigants that I will call sophisticated are more likely to use the cue
nonprecedential opinion to dispatch an appeal on the merits, but the difference is that
the panel here does not control the choice. And while this is always true of panels
assigned to hear appeals that settle prior to a merits decision, in most cases the
settlement activity it is safe to assume that there is no systematic effect created
because the activity is not responsive to the panel itself. Here, the situation is quite
different. Decisions are not being entered precisely because of the panel
composition, and the distribution of those excluded panels is not random. This is
potentially misleading because parties might reasonably consult the recorded
decisions of the court either to determine whether to file an appeal or to guide their
behavior in the hopes of avoiding the litigation process altogether. That consultation
might lead to distorted predictions if certain votes of the court are essentially
invisible because they led to settlement rather than some more formal judicial action.
Second, the potential for a predictability distortion may affect the way that
judges themselves behave. For example, some judges may motivated by a desire to
minimize the amount of work that they must perform on the court. Judges interested
in shirking might seek to make themselves as predictable as possible. Predictable
judges are most likely to sit on predictable panels, and predictable panels lead to
more settlement and less judicial effort. But the process of becoming predictable
itself requires judicial effort because the judge can no longer simply minimize
participation on panels by writing majority opinions when assigned and simply
going along with the majority in all other cases. Instead, the shirking judge must
cultivate a perception of predictability by writing (presumably short) dissents in
some cases. In sum, whether an early announcement procedure creates an
opportunity for a shirking judge depends on whether the effort saved by being
perceived as predictable outweighs the effort required to create that perception.
Other judges may be interested in maximizing their influence on the caselaw. A
predictability distortion might encourage an influence maximizer to become
unpredictable, which would maximize her placement on unpredictable panels. But
again, the actions required to become unpredictable threaten to undermine the
overarching goal of maximizing influence on the caselaw. As a result, the influence
maximizer might instead choose to write strong and consistent opinions, even though
that consistency may have the auxiliary effect of reducing the number of panels on
which she sits. The choice between these two options should depend on the overall
effectiveness of the early announcement procedure and on the number of other
predictable members of the court. A choice to become unpredictable makes sense
only if the effect of the procedure is dramatic. Because of the various barriers
discussed in Part II, that condition is unlikely to be met; the predictability distortion
is therefore unlikely to affect the behavioral incentives of influence maximizing
judges.
122
See supra Part II.B.
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more accurately and more often. As a result, the early announcement
procedure will select those litigants out of the oral argument pool at a
higher rate than unsophisticated ones. Over time, the cases that
proceed to panel decisions on the merits will involve relatively greater
numbers of unsophisticated litigants. 123
The question is whether this sophistication-based distortion
should be viewed as problematic. The answer depends in part on
whether sophisticated and unsophisticated litigants behave differently
in other relevant respects. If they do not, the distortion would not
matter at all. But this is unlikely. Instead, sophisticated litigants are
likely to differ from unsophisticated ones in terms of the quality of the
claims brought and the manner in which those claims are presented.
Consider first the quality of claims. Unsophisticated parties may be
expected to appeal relatively weaker cases. Ordinarily, rational actors
should file appeals only if the expected outcome from doing so
exceeds the cost of the appeal, and that is most likely to happen when
the quality of the appeal is high. 124 But what makes parties
unsophisticated under this definition is that they are for some reason
123

Assuming a simple two-party dispute, three different party arrays are
possible: Sophisticated vs. Sophisticated (SS), Sophisticated vs. Unsophisticated
(SU), and Unsophisticated vs. Unsophisticated (UU). The reaction to the
announcement of a highly predictable panel is not uniform across these arrays. In an
SS dispute, both sides will use the information to settle, and the case will not
proceed to a merits decision. In a UU dispute, no settlement will result, either
because the parties will not react at all or because they will interpret the information
in a self-serving way. In an SU dispute, the results are mixed. If the panel favors the
sophisticated party, no settlement will result because the settlement demands of the
sophisticated party will appear too steep to the unsophisticated party. If the panel
instead favors the unsophisticated party, settlement may occur because the
sophisticated party’s offer will look attractive relative to the unsophisticated party’s
expected outcome. Of course, a party unsophisticated in the sense of not making use
of panel announcement information may also be unsophisticated in the sense of
making an accurate outcome prediction absent that information. If so, and if the
unsophisticated party has a distorted “expected outcome,” then settlement may not
occur because the offer may yet appear unsatisfactory. Moreover, if the
sophisticated party is aware that the other party is unsophisticated, the terms of the
settlement may be affected. Whereas the terms for an SS dispute should be very
close to the new (and mutually held) expected value, the settlement for an SU dispute
may be close to the unsophisticated party’s old expected value.
124
See generally Shavell, supra note 52, at 401-11. But not all appeals will
involve a positive expected value; for discussions on the possibilities for negative
value suits, see id. at 419-423; see also, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suits with Negative
Expected Value, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE
LAW 551-54 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
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unwilling or unable to engage in the expected outcome assessment that
would lead to a post-cue response. Because the original decision
regarding the quality and likely success of the appeal is based on a
similar assessment, the lack of sophistication will sabotage both. In
short, appeals that present low quality claims are frequently a function
of misguided notions about chances for success, and unsophisticated
litigants are more likely to be misguided.
Even in cases where the underlying quality of the appeal is
identical, a second sort of difference might exist: Sophisticated parties
may present their appeal in a different manner than unsophisticated
parties. These differences might take various forms. One significant
possibility relates to how the issues in the case are framed for the
court. Issues related to an appeal can be presented or defended in any
number of ways. Suppose, for instance, that twelve plausible sources
of error exist, but that only three stand a significant likelihood of
success. Some litigants will choose to include all twelve issues in an
attempt to convince the court that something was amiss, while others
will choose instead to focus only on the three potential “winners” on
the theory that inclusion of the other nine may undermine their
credibility in the eyes of the court. Differences of this sort are not
limited to contrasting views on litigation strategy. In a given record,
there may be numerous ways to theorize the legal claims involved. A
paradigmatic example is the choice between contract and tort theory as
a basis for relief. Whether related to strategy or to legal theory,
sophisticated parties may make different framing choices than
unsophisticated ones. And because the ability to make those choices
optimally may be related to the ability to successfully integrate new
information, sophisticated parties may do a systematically better job of
shaping arguments that will persuade an appellate court.
Finally, there may also be differences in the quality of briefing
as between unsophisticated and sophisticated litigants.
These
differences might exist even if the merits of the underlying claims are
identical, and even if the conception of how to frame those claims for
purposes of the appeal is also identical. Again, the intuition is that
unsophisticated litigants are likely to file briefs that are of lower
quality. The basis for that intuition is that failure to respond to panel
announcement might be viewed as a sign of incompetence, and
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incompetence in that respect may be accompanied by incompetence in
others. 125
Because there is reason to believe that sophisticated and
unsophisticated litigants will bring appeals that are different in quality
and in presentation, a sophistication distortion may affect the court’s
performance of its primary functions. At the extreme, the distortion
creates tension between the need for the court’s action to reflect the
participation of the litigants, and the need for the court to resolve
disputes and create legal rules in accordance with public values. The
need to reflect litigant participation is connected to the norm of strong
responsiveness developed by Lon Fuller in his posthumously
published article The Forms and Limits of Adjudication. 126 In order to
preserve and guarantee participation by the parties, which he views as
“the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication,” 127 Fuller concludes
that judges should assume a passive role and should – to the extent
possible – structure their disposition of cases according to the way
they have been presented by the parties. 128
In an article published concurrently with Fuller’s, Melvin Aron
Eisenberg strengthened the norm by arguing that responsiveness to
parties – and not just party participation alone – is what defines
adjudication as a tool of dispute resolution. A court fulfills its dispute
resolution function only to the extent that it resolves the dispute that

125

A fourth difference might be that sophisticated and unsophisticated litigants
file different types of appeals. So for example, perhaps contract cases are likely to
involve sophisticated parties while employment cases are likely to involve
unsophisticated ones. This difference is likely to cause an effect only if it is very
extreme, so much so that it results in very few cases of particular types surviving to
the merits stage. Defining how many would qualify as “very few” would depend on
the importance of incrementalism and adaptiveness in a given “type” of case. If very
few cases in a particular type are filed, the court may find it difficult to perform its
caselaw production function adequately because it would not have sufficient
occasion to issue opinions that would clarify the law for external actors. This would
be particularly so if the court feels constrained by notions of minimalism. See CASS
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, (2001). See also Christopher J, Peters, Assessing
The New Judicial Minimalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 454 (2000).
126
See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV.
353 (1978).
127
Id. at 364.
128
Id. at 388. Fuller acknowledges that it is not always possible to structure
disposition in this way, but he nevertheless urges courts to “work toward an
achievement of the closest approximation of it.” Id.
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the parties have perceived and presented, and to that end it does well
to respond as directly as possible. 129
Although implicit in the work of both Fuller and Eisenberg,
more recent arguments in favor of the norm of strong responsiveness
have been explicitly rooted in terms of legitimacy. For instance, Larry
Solum has explored the link between strong responsiveness and
perceptions of legitimacy by participants in the adjudicative
process. 130 Participants will view the resolution of their dispute as
legitimate only if they participate in the resolution process in a
meaningful way, and responsiveness is one sure way to assure parties
that that condition has been met. Systematic deviations from strong
responsiveness threaten to disrupt legitimacy on the part of those who
rely on the courts to resolve disputes. Because parties will not
voluntarily submit to illegitimate forms of adjudication, instability
would follow.
Strong responsiveness may also be necessary to secure
legitimacy in the eyes of non-participants. Christopher Peters has
defended strong legitimacy as a guarantor of the democratic
legitimacy of rules created and imposed by the judicial branch. 131
Responding to criticisms of adjudication as a fundamentally
nondemocratic enterprise, Peters emphasizes the involvement
throughout the adjudication process of interested parties, 132 who
perform valuable functions including: initiating a case, framing the
issues it presents, and representing the various interests implicated by
those issues. 133 Each of those functions limits the court’s discretion in
fashioning a decisional rule that will bind other parties, but those
limits are effective only to the extent that the court actually respects
the parties’ input. Strong responsiveness thus emerges as an essential
129

See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the
Consultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 410, 413 (1978)
(arguing that strong responsiveness is a necessary component of the court’s dispute
resolution function “insofar as the parties contemplate that the court will settle their
dispute on the basis of the issues as the parties see them”).
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Solum, supra note 106, at 275.
131
Christopher Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 312
(1997).
132
To ensure that the parties to disputes are indeed interested, Peters
understandably encourages strict application of existing justiciability doctrines. Id.
at 428.
133
Indeed, in Peters’ view, parties effectively “serve as interest representatives
of subsequent litigants in much the same way that we expect our elected legislators
to serve as interest representatives of their constituents.” Id. at 347.
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component of the court’s legitimate exercise of its caselaw production
function. 134
Whatever its merits in the abstract, strict adherence to a norm
of strong responsiveness is not always desirable. Of particular
relevance here, the norm makes sense only when the quality of the
appeals being decided is high. Consider first dispute resolution.
Fuller proposes that courts are primarily engaged in the arbitration of
claims presented by competing parties. That is all well and good, but
precisely how are those competing claims to be resolved? On one
view, that is a question of minimal significance; so long as the parties
are provided the opportunity to participate, and so long as the
resolution is accepted by the parties themselves, the nature and manner
of the resolution is irrelevant. Indeed, this seems to be Fuller’s view,
and his norms of attention, explanation and strong responsiveness are
most consistent with that model of dispute resolution. But perhaps
dispute resolution requires something more. On this broader view,
proper resolution of competing claims must draw on, and be
representative of, public values. This is particularly so in so-called
“public law” cases, where interests other than those presented by the
two sides may be implicated and may need to be accounted for. 135 But
it may be true in more traditional cases as well. According to Owen
Fiss, perhaps the most ardent proponent of this view, “all rights
enforced by courts are public.” 136 If so, then the nature of the dispute
resolution is a matter of concern after all; we feel confident that the
134

Peters identifies two further components that are essential to his model of
adjudication as representation. First, courts must correctly apply the doctrines of
stare decisis such that a decision binds “only those future parties who are similarly
situated to the original litigants in every meaningful way.” Id. at 375. Second, the
“conduct of the parties litigating the precedential case [must] meet a threshold
standard of adequacy.” Id. at 376.
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The public law model of adjudication is most closely associated with Abram
Chayes. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976).
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Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term – Foreword: The Forms of
Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35-36 (1979). Fiss’s view of adjudication led him to
grossly minimize the court’s dispute resolution function. Id. at 30 (“[C]ourts exist to
give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes.”). For that reason, he is
often described as being concerned primarily with the court’s “lawmaking” function
rather than its dispute resolution function. See Oldfather, supra note 103, at 148-49.
But of course courts must be in the business of resolving disputes at least at some
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can be any court action at all. And the emphasis placed on public values by Fiss can
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dispute has been resolved properly only if the resolution reflects public
values, and that is most likely to occur when those values have been
adequately represented. This view of dispute resolution is not wholly
inconsistent with strong responsiveness, but it does impose a natural
condition: The quality of representation must be adequate. 137 When
that condition is met, the nature of the adversarial structure will ensure
that the court is informed of the public values implicated.138 But when
it is not, a court runs a risk of imposing an undesirable resolution if it
considers the case strictly as it is presented and framed by the
participants.
The problem in terms of caselaw production is similar.
Tension between strong responsiveness and caselaw production has
long been recognized. As described by Chad Oldfather, the tension
exists “for the simple reason that whatever rules the court generates as
a result of its resolution of the specific dispute before it must be of the
sort that can be applied to similar disputes in the future. If the dispute
before the court is somehow not representative of the broader category
of disputes of which it is a part, or if the parties’ arguments fail to
address issues that are critical to the formulation of a rule that must be
applied across a range of future disputes, then strong responsiveness
could lead to a decision that is based on an incomplete set of inputs
and thus generate law that is inappropriate to the needs of future
disputants.” 139 Critics of strong responsiveness have pointed to this
tension as a reason to abandon the norm altogether. 140 Defenders of
the norm have predictably been less categorical, but have recognized
that deviations may be necessary where the potential for tension is
particularly acute. 141 The most commonly recognized deviation of
this sort is in pure public law cases, but the potential for tension is also
137

In pure “public law” cases, even this condition may not be enough to permit
resolution through responsiveness. In these situations, the large number of public
interests involved may not be adequately represented by the nominal parties to the
dispute, and the court may therefore need to “construct a broader representational
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Chayes, supra note 135, at 1308.
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Eisenberg, supra note 129, at 413-14.
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affect a large group of parties not directly involved in the dispute. See Eisenberg,
supra note 129, at 428 (concluding that in public law cases, “the judge may
subordinate the norm of settling the dispute that has been put to him, on the basis of
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acute where quality is low. In Eisenberg’s formulation, “[t]he force of
this norm [of strong responsiveness] may . . . vary according to the
nature of the inquiry and the quality of the parties’ participation.” 142
The demands of both dispute resolution and caselaw
production suggest that a quality condition must be met before a norm
of strong responsiveness is imposed. If that condition is not met, the
court must make a choice. One option is to adhere to the norm of
strong responsiveness and to take on the risk that the outcome would
be problematic in terms of caselaw production or dispute resolution (at
least if the proper performance of those tasks is understood as
encompassing some notion of public values). The other option is to
forego the norm of strong responsiveness in order to perform the
dispute resolution and caselaw production functions effectively.
When low quality appeals appear only periodically on a court’s
docket, neither option is fraught with peril; occasional deviations from
strong responsiveness are unlikely to generate systemic turbulence,
and adherence to the norm even where the court views the case far
differently is made palatable by the availability of non-precedential
opinions. 143
But the situation may be quite different if the sophistication
distortion operates to reduce the general quality of both the claims
presented and the advocacy on behalf of those claims. At a certain
point, that denigration will threaten the court’s ability to perform its
functions while remaining strongly responsive. Faced with appeals of
consistently low quality, a court may opt to hold fast to the norm of
responsiveness, although one suspects that adherence would be purely
formal. In other words, the court may decide based on considerations
not presented by the parties and then artificially frame the decision
instead in the parties’ terms. Such an approach would tend to preserve
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Id. at 413 (emphasis added). Peters also recognizes that his model of
adjudication that calls for strong responsiveness as a guarantor of legitimacy is
desirable only when the quality of representation has been adequate. See Peters,
supra note 131, at 376.
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Courts may choose to adhere to the litigants’ conception of a case even when
they disagree with it if they feel that there is little to be gained by a deviation from
the norm. The availability of the nonprecedential opinion makes this artificial
adherence relatively costless – it preserves legitimacy in the eyes of litigants without
interfering with the court’s caselaw production function, precisely because the court
chooses to forego its caselaw production function in appeals that it denotes as
nonprecedential. This approach is acceptable largely because the court is still able to
perform its caselaw production function effectively while deciding the other appeals
on its docket.
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legitimacy in the eyes of participants, and it might even be viewed as
satisfactory in terms of dispute resolution because the true resolution
of the dispute would reflect public values. But the disconnect between
the true basis for the decision and its formal terms – or, put differently,
the absence of judicial candor – is problematic in terms of the court’s
caselaw production function, at least in the sense that it frustrates the
ability of future litigants to predict how courts will behave going
forward. 144 An even more likely scenario is that courts faced with
consistently low quality appeals would begin to systematically deviate
from the norm of strong responsiveness. But such deviations would
come at a price. Parties involved in disputes would begin to view the
court’s resolution as illegitimate if the court’s output does not reflect
their input. More importantly, the rules created by the court may be
viewed as less legitimate by external actors because they do not grow
out of a representational process.
The sophistication distortion is similar to the distortion created
by non-uniform panel predictability in the sense that both have the
potential to create serious jurisprudential problems in the extreme
case. But the two are also similar in the sense that the extreme case is
very unlikely. In terms of the sophistication distortion, the extreme
case is created not by an abundance of low quality appeals, but by the
dearth of high quality ones. So long as a court is presented with a
sufficient number of high quality appeals, it can use those cases to
satisfy the demands of caselaw production while remaining responsive
to litigant participation. As for the low quality appeals, it can simply
minimize them by issuing narrow (and, if the mechanism is available,
nonprecedential) opinions. Put differently, the extreme case will arise
only if the rule works extremely well among the pool of sophisticated
litigants – so well that cases involving those litigants become scarce.
That is unlikely because of the existence of the other intractable
barriers discussed in Part II. For example, so long as a minimum
condition of unpredictability among the panels is met, the early
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announcement policy will not winnow the pool of sophisticated
appeals to a problematic level. The court may find itself dealing with
a relatively larger percentage of low quality appeals, but it will avoid
large scale problems of legitimacy and caselaw production.
C. The Motivation Distortion
A final distortion stems from the fact that cases involving
litigants who are interested in a judgment per se may be relatively less
responsive to the introduction of new information regarding likely
outcome. For litigants who view the judgment as instrumental – for
example, as a way to extract or withhold money from the other party –
panel announcement may offer a valuable cue and permit settlement.
But this is so because these litigants view a reliable prediction about
the judgment as the functional equivalent of the judgment itself. In
contrast, litigants who are interested in the judgment per se do not
view the two as interchangeable, and they are therefore less likely to
respond to panel announcement.
The motivational differences between these two types of
litigants should mean that those seeking judgments per se are
overrepresented among the pool of cases that proceed to oral
argument, even absent an early announcement procedure. But that
overrepresentation will be even more pronounced after such a
procedure is introduced. If these two types of litigants are evenly
distributed among cases, the overrepresentation does not matter much.
But one suspects that the distribution is not even. Rather, litigants
seeking judgments per se may be overrepresented in certain classes of
cases (employment discrimination, say). 145 If that is so, then the
motivation distortion can affect the content mix of the oral argument
pool.
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For a discussion about how the selection of cases at the trial level is affected
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CONCLUSION
The theoretical case for a settlement effect generated by early
panel announcement is based on a straightforward model of cue and
response. The court provides an informational cue to litigants when it
discloses panel composition, and it assumes that some litigants will
seek settlement in response because they will perceive the information
as relevant to the appeal’s likely outcome. In practice, the cue and
response mechanism appears to be operating in some cases, although
not in overwhelming fashion. This article has attempted to accomplish
two goals: to explore barriers that prevent the mechanism from having
greater effect, and to explore ways that those barriers make the
mechanism’s limited effect non-random.
In terms of barriers, some are created by weaknesses in the
cue, while others are created by weaknesses in litigants’ ability to
interpret and respond to the cue. Recognizing that these barriers exist
could lead the way to procedural modifications designed to alleviate
them, but in this case effective yet acceptable modifications are
difficult to imagine. Improving effectiveness would require the court
to embrace or acknowledge the attitudinal model, and that almost
certainly represents an unacceptable cost. Instead, the barriers seem
intractable, and their intractability suggests various distortions
generated by the procedure’s limited effect.
So what does all of this say about whether an early
announcement procedure is worthwhile? The answer to that question
depends to some extent on further empirical study of the contours of
the various distortions described here, and to some extent on a
subjective evaluation about the value or danger of those distortions.
For my part, I am doubtful that the procedure is effective in terms of
decreasing the court’s overall workload, although it may create a
welcome shift in the allocation of that workload away from judges and
toward the court’s administrative staff. Moreover, at the margins it
may well promote panels that are more diverse, and that seems a
benefit worth the costs of increased pandering during argument and an
increase in unsophisticated appeals. But my primary intention here is
not to resolve that question definitively; rather, it is to suggest that a
full understanding of the procedure’s tradeoffs is considerably more
complicated than a simple choice between attorney pandering and
decreased caseload.
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This connects to a final, larger point. As the appellate caseload
continues to rise, and as other mechanisms for dealing with the
caseload crunch come under pressure, 146 courts can be expected to
consider new ways that they might exercise control over internal rules
and procedures to procure relief. But such efforts are fraught with
peril. Maneuvering within the space created by local rulemaking
authority in an effort to generate caseload reductions can be a
dangerous business with jurisprudential implications. Indirect
maneuvers such as cue and response mechanisms are particularly
problematic because they are not self-executing; instead, the court
must rely on litigants to receive the cue, process it accurately, and
react to it rationally. But if parties do not receive, process and react
uniformly – and it is a near-sure bet that they do not – then the court’s
decision to provide information alters the pool of cases that remain. In
short, courts should think carefully about how the introduction of local
rules and procedures, and particularly those that depend on litigant
response, may ultimately affect the cases they hear and the way they
decide them.
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unpublished opinion to dispose of straightforward appeals will lose some of its luster
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